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CHAPTE.."Ft I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The question which forms the core of this paper is the 
relationship of faith and reason. Is faith reasonable? 
Does every aspect of that in which man believes need to fit 
the requirement of reason? Does reason support faith or 
faith reason? Is reason possible without faith? 
To establish this relationship also means the estab-
lishment of the limitation of each. What is the area of 
faith? How is kno-vrledge obtained? Why is faith necessary 
at all? Or why is reason necessary? To ans\ver these ques-
tions one must also ascertain the correct view of the world, 
of man, of God, of revelation, and something of their mutual 
relationships. 
Since this theological controversy has been raised by 
a number of recent theologians, it is to their writings one 
must turn. The three chosen by the author of this paper 
are Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and E.J. Carnell. 
B. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Generally, Modernistic Liberalism believes that it alone 
of all Christian theologies has subjected.every aspect of faith 
to reason. In fact, reason has so subjected the entire field 
of religion which it surveys that even God has been brought 
2 
low. In many instances, He has been considered as no more 
than a figment of the human mind. God was good, and man 
was good. Every day and in every way the world was get-
ting better and better. An optimistic view of history was 
this indeed in the light of selfishness and greed which 
dominated the motives of the nations of the wo~ld. Though 
it could survive the scandal of the early nineteenth cen-
tury, liberalism could not survive the hol~caust of war. 
From the smoking ruins of Central Europe there arose a new 
theology, a theology which no longer asserted the divine 
immanence nor the goodness of man. Certainly the Second 
World War has done nothing to dispel this new theology's 
threatened sway over the theological world. 
Since the basic error of t he liberals was 
immanence, it is logical to expect that the basic 
thesis of the new theology is transcendence and 
discontinuity. Discontinuity of man with God re-
placed old continuity. "Where liberal theology 
saw the goodness of God as continuous with the 
highest human goodness and the fulfilment of life 
as gradual sanctification and as the conservation 
of value, nee-orthodoxy is more concerned with 
the discontinuity between God's goodness and hu-
man sin, and visualizes the relationship of the 
eternal to history as a dialectic one in which 
God as the End fulfils man's desires and expecta-
tions only by disappointing them in their corrup-
ted form." ••• Barth charges the liberals with 
having made God in their own image. He himself 
defines God as absolutely transcendent, the whol-
ly other, the deus absconditus. Anything less1 than wholly other is but an oversized man ••• 
1. Edward J. Carnell, The Theologz Qf Reinhold Niebuhr 
(Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1950~, 
P• 3lo 
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How does one know God? By faith or by reason? Or by 
both? If there is a line of demarcation between the two, 
where does one begin and the other end? More important 
still, how does one know where this line of demarcation is? 
Modern man demands the answers to problems. It is not 
sufficient for him to be told \.vhat is v-rrong , but that which 
is right also. How can faith be justified before him un-
less an appeal for faith is compelling? 
C • OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research ar e as follovrs: 
1. A short biographical sketch of each individual 
who has been discussed. 
2. The philosophical assumptions of each man were 
examinede 
3. The theological viewpoint of the men i•Tas pre-
sented in the light of their respective philosophical as-
sumptions. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROBLEM 
Because of their outstanding success in their respec-
tive theological circles, this study has been limited to 
the views of Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and EaJ. Carnell 
upon this problemo These were chosen because of their pur-
ported claim to be heirs of the reformer s, particularly of 
John Calvin., 
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E. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
There can, at the present time, be no exact definition 
of terms given8 The emphasis will be placed upon an induc-
tive study . of faith and reason in all of the authors, per -
mitting their usage to determine exac t meanings. However, 
as a working hypothesis~ the following definitions are sub-
mitted since they are related so closely to the central 
problem. Some aspects of these definitions, no doubt, will 
apply to all of the men to be studied. 
1. Reason 
The special mental faculty vrhich in think-
ing ideas of absolute completeness and uncondi-
tionedness ~ranscends the condition of possible 
experience. 
2. Faith 
Faith is the giving of oneself to be con-
trolled by what commands trust and devotion. • .3 
E. METHOD OF PROCEDURE 
The method of procedure has been limited to an induc-
tive study of the writings of these meno Only for purposes 
of biography have other authors been consulted. A short 
biography of each individual has been included in order to 
demonstrate under what circumstances and what particular 
2. Dagobert D. Rm1es, Dictionary Q£ Philosophz (New 
York, Philosophical Library, n.d.), p. 264. 
3. H(enry) N(elson) Vl(ieman) "Faith," An :&,qcycloQe-
dia of Religion, compiled by ~ergilius Ferm (New York 7 
The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 270. 
background each has written. 
Due to the limitation of the author of this thesis, 
most of these studies have been made in authorized trans-
lations. Both Barth and Brunner have written principally 
in the German language, making this a necessity. 
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As much as is humanly possible, this researcher has made 
an attempt to be objective. All criticisms and suggestions 
concerning the various authors have been made from the cri-
teria which they themselves have declared valid. It must 
be noted however, that in all too many instances, this pa-
per has fallen short of complete objectivity. This inves-
, 
tigator wishes to apologize to all who feel that their 01~ 
viewpoint has not been fairly represented. The author can 
only beg forgiveness on the basis of our common humanity. 
All references quoted by this author from the Bible 
have been taken from the American Standard Version of 1901. 
For those quotations contained within quotations of other 
authors, due reference must be made to that author's work. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION OF ICARL BARTH 
A. BIOGRAPHY 
Karl Bar t h qas been recognized as one of the outstand-
i ng contemporary theologians. .AI;'ound his works and thought 
have raged controversies which few men have experienced. 
Barth was born i n 1886, in Ba sel, Switzerlandl son of Pro-
fessor Fr itz Barth, author of a book on the chief problems 
of the life of Jesus. 2 It has been stated that the typical 
life of a Neo-Orthodox theologian could be traced from a 
Conservative background to Liberalism to Neo-Orthodoxy. It 
is doubtful i f Barth vias a true Conservative~ but the ear ly 
influence of 1'1odern Liberalism is everywhere evident in his 
writings. Wi t hout accepting this viewpoint t horoughly, Barth 
could never have become the associate editor of the Rits-
chilian journal, Die Christliche Welt.3 
Barth's university days were spent in Berne, Berlin, 
4 Tubingen and Marburg. After a ministry of two years at 
1. J.L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought (Phila-
delphia, The MQhlenberg Press, 1946), II , 172. 
2. Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of ~~ Theo~ 
(London, Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 19~), · p. 271. 
3. Neve , QQ. cit. II, 172. 
4. H(erbert) H(irsh,.;ald), "Karl Barth 7 11 Chamber's Encyclopedia (New York, Oxford Univers1ty Press, 1950), 
B, 141. 
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Geneva (1909-1911) he accepted a pastorate at Safenwil 
(Aargau). It was during this pastorate in Switzerland that 
the great First World War broke out , and, significantly, it 
was here that radical changes were introduced into his the-
ology. 
It in no way discredits a man to examine the immediate 
environment in which his thought was born. Though a theo-
logical truth may be an eternal verity, yet its elevation 
to the forefront of human thought usually took place in a 
particular environment which was conducive of that thought. 
An examination of that environment, moreover, often is able 
to lead the examiner to a more critical and literal inter-
pretation of what has been thought before him. 
Until this time of radical change, Barth had been com-
mitted to an optimistic theology. This is evidenced by his 
committal to the Swiss Religio-Social movement of Hermann 
Kutter and Leonhard Ragaz. 6 Reacting against this human 
attempt to usher in the Kingdom of God, Barth wrote a paper 
entitled, ~ Glaube sn den Persoenlichen QQit, in which he 
stated that the kingdom of God is not measured by human a-
chievement and progress, but rather in the terms of God's 
Lordship.? 
There is much which is similar in the historical and 
6. Neve·, QJ2.• ill· II , 172. 
7. Ibid. . 
political situations of Kierkegaard's day and that of 
Barth's.8 Kierkegaard was stricken by the worldliness 
which had smitten the Danish church of his day. His dis-
position, whatever the cause, was anything but cheerful. 
8 
It was the extreme seriousness of life which impressed him. 
This worldliness was caused, Kierkegaard believed, by the 
extremely optimistic theology prevalent in the church at 
that time. This, he felt, was not at all warranted by the 
act.u.al facts. There were no omens which seemed to him to 
declare that the church was ushering in the Kingdom of God. 
Everywhere immorality prevailed, both inside and outside the 
church. Denmark had just engaged in a war with Germany and 
had lost part of her riches and most productive territory, 
Schleswig-Holstein, which added additional grief to his 
troubled soul. A century later, in Barth's day, Germany 
had lost a war. In addition, she lost all of her territor-
ial possessions in Africa and the islands of the sea. The 
rich Saar basin, with its wealth of natural resources, was 
taken from her. This \oJ'as in striking contradiction to the 
philosophy of Hegel that it was to the Germans the world 
could look for the ideal of absolute freedom.9 As in Den-
mark one hundred years before, a severe financial depression 
8. Ewart Aubrey, Present Theological Tendencies (New 
York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1936), p. 74. 
9. G.W.F. Hegel1 Lectures Qll the Philosoyh~ of His-tory, trans. by J. Sibree (London, George Bell and 
Sons, 1902), p. 354. 
struck Germany. This, coupled with the other disasters, 
brought the realization of the futility of human effort 
9 
upon Barth. Social idealism, he concluded, was only a dis-
illusionment.10 
During his pastorate at Safenwill, Barth wrote his fa-
mous Commentary QU St, Paul's Epistle~~ Romans. (1917). 
In this commentary he sought to reinterpret Paul's teach-
ings about God, man, and human destiny in the light of his 
t\.,rentieth century surroundings. 11 This book gave him the-
ological fame throughout the religious 'I.Y"orld. 
In 1921 Barth became a university professor, first at 
Gottingen, then Munster in 1925 and Bonn in 1930. After 
the rise of National Socialism in Germany, Barth was forced 
to return to his native Switzerland. His work for the con-
fessional church in Germany before he left proved to be the 
backbone of its resistance in its struggle against Hitler. 
It has been said that the famous Declaration of Barmen (1934) 
was essentially his writing. 12 In Switzerland Barth was 
appointed professor of theology at Basel, but at the close 
of World vlar II, he again returned to Germany •13 
10. Aubrey, ~· cit. p. 74. 
11. ~. 
12. H(erbert) H(irschwald), "Karl Barth," Chamber'~ 
Encyclopedia (New York, Oxford University Press, 19 0), 
II, 141. 
13. "Karl Barth," The Encyclopedia Americana (Ne,tl 
York, Americana Corporation, 1952), III, p. 288. 
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B. REACTION AGAINST LIBERALISM 
It has already been noted that Barth represents a re-
action against Liberalism. From Hegel's "Whatever is, is 
right," Barth might be characterized by "Whatever is, is 
wrong." Both of these statements must, of course , be 
rightly understood in the light of the philosophies which 
they represent. An allied statement characterizing Barth's 
thought is that everything in the natural sphere of time 
and space is relative. This would i nclude man, his ethical 
systems, and his attempts at systematization of thought. 
Whenever a philosophy claims to be a relative philoso-
phy the question must always follow ~ , to what is this rela-
tive? As far as considering this world relative, Barth is 
in superficial agreement with ~dern Liberalism, but when 
the question is pushed further, we then see that there is 
no real agreement, at least at this point. Modern liber-
als, following in the legacy of Hegel, have made all human 
endeavor relative to the yardstick of progress. .As the 
struggling spirit of man ascends the ~ale of progress, his 
values also ascend. On the other hand, Barth vehemently 
denied that there could be any scale of human achievement. 
That although all is relative, it is relative not to man, 
but to God. Hegel sees the world composed of metaphysical 
opposites which man gradually solves through the aid of in-
finite Spirit. As he solves these, he ascends the ladder 
of progress. Barth denounces this deifying of man, stating 
that these great contradictions cannot be solved by man, 
11 
but that man must rest content to let these reside within 
the mysteries of God. Hence, for man there is no complete 
system of thought. If he were to attempt this impossibil-
ity, man must either not account for all the facts, lapse 
into idealism in order to make all the facts fit; or he 
must be forced to give up. Even the attempt at such a sys-
tem, Barth has argued, is sinful. It is the building of 
the tower of Bab~l, man ' s attempt to make himself master of 
the situation, hence gods. This attempt has been made be-
cause man basically has not trusted his Creator, willing 
more to place trust in his own powers. The difference then, 
which is most striking between Hegel and Barth is that the 
former has placed no limitations upon the ability of the 
reason, while Barth has advocated that it is restricted and 
limited. 
C. NATURAL THEOLOGY 
It would do well for us at this time to examine the 
position of Barth as to the reliability of natural theol-
ogy. In this area of thought, he is noted for the pamphlet, 
Nein, which he wrote in rejecting Brunner's qualified ac-
ceptance of naturaly-· theology. Upon this point, Barth and 
Brunner were separated and have never since been reunited. 
Concerning natural theology, Barth wrote: 
I certainly see -- with astonishment -- that 
such a science as Lord Gifford had in mind does 
exist, but I do not .see how it is possible for it 
to ex~st. I am convinced that so far as it has 
12 
existed and still e!~sts, it owes its existence 
to a radical error. 
If man can learn nothing from his natural surroundings as 
to the nature or even the possibility of God , then human 
reason must be limited to that of the natural sphere. 15 
At this point, _ it might be noted that Barth is in full a-
greement with the epistemologies of both Hume and Kant. 
But Barth has laid forth the claim that it is only to the 
Word of God we can turn if one vtishes to possess certainty 
about God. In so turning away from and rejecting. the human 
reason, Barth believed he was turning from the natural the-
ology and dogma of the Catholic Church to a proper emphasis 
as presented by the Reformers. 
But the Reformation and the teaching of the 
Reformation Churches stand in an antithesis to 
"Natural Theology" \-thich is at once clear and in-
structive for both ••• that , however, in no way 
alters the principle that the revival of the gos-
pel by Luther and Calvin consisted in their desire 
to see both the church and human salvation founded 
on the Word of God alone, on God's revelation in 
Jesus Christ, as it is atfgsted in the Scripture, 
and on faith in the Word. 
This abandonment of human reason, the abandonment of all 
natural theology, is done purposely and deliberately by 
Barth because they are unlike God. God is absolute, while 
14. Karl Barth , Ihg Knowledge of ~ ~ the Service 
of ~ According to the Teaching of the Reformation 
TGreat Britain, Charles Scribner's Sons , 1939) , p. 5. 
15. Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Eugene Meland, 
American· Philosophies 21. Religion (Nel.v York, Harper 
a.nd Brothers, Publishers, 193 ), p. 79. 
16. Barth, QQ. cit. p. 8. 
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his conception of all that can be called cosmos is limited 
and relative. 
I repeat, it does not mean the negation, the 
denial or the depreciation of that which is not 
God. But it does meant that this ±?tter factor is 
criticized, limited and relative. 
How can man know that there is a God? This is the 
heart of the Barthian theology. One knows through the Word 
of God. In summary concerning this vital point we quote 
Barth again, 
Knowledge of the one and only God becomes 
possible and real 7 because this does happen, be-
cause God does ar~se and makes Himself visible in 
the world and distinguishes Himself !rQm the world 
as its creator, thereby making the wor!g visible 
and distinguishing it as His creation. 
This message, this distinguishing Himself from the world, 
can, in the final analysis, be called the Word of God. 
Where does one find the Word of God? Where does God 
make Himself known? The first place one would look would 
logically and naturally be the Bible which has been known 
as the Word of God throughout the centuries. :t-1oreover, as 
has already been noted, 1 9 it is to the Biblical teachings 
that Barth has claimed to turn. Let us examine in a pre-
liminary sketch what Barth has found of value in the Bible. 
17. Ibid., p. 16. 
18. Ibid., p. 15. 
19. Cf. Ante, p. 12 . 
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D. THE BIBLE 
Barth's view of the Bible can be found in a series of 
negative presentations in which he has presented what is 
not to be found in the -Bible. The first of these negative 
presentations is history. Whether the history which is 
presented in the Bible is true history or not is really be-
side the point. The real issue is this, that the Bible is 
not primarily a history of events, events which can be re-
solved into a system. Referring to those who have read the 
Bible for the historical record contained therein, Barth 
wrote: "But the pleasure is short-lived. The pictur·e, on 
closer inspection, proves quite incomprehensible and flat 
if it is meant only for history.n20 
Biblical history in the Old and New Testa-
ments is not really history at all, but seen from 
above is a series of free divine acts and seen 
from below a series of fruitless attempts to un-
dertake something in itself impossible. From the 
viewpoint of ordered development in particular 
and in general it is quite incomprehensible--as 
every religious teac~lr who is worth his salt 
knows only too well. 
Thus, even more forcibly, Barth has denied all meaning to 
Biblical history. 
Fundamental Protestantism, or the group of Protestant 
20. Thomas s. Kepler ed.; Contemporary Religiouy 
Thought (New York, Ab{ngdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941 , 
p. 134. 
21. Karl Barth, The Word of Q.Q.9. ~ ~ ~ Qf. Man, 
trans. by Douglas Horton (no location, The Pilgrim 
Press, 1928), p. 72. 
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believers generally known as Orthodox, together with the 
Catholic Church, have generally believed that from the 
Bible one must draw his doctrine and dogma about God. This 
is just exactly what the Bible has not purported to do. 
It is not the right human thoughts about 
God which form the content of the Bible, but 
the right divine thoughts about men. The Bi-
ble tells us not how we should talk with God 
but what he says to us; not how we find the . 
way to Him, but how He has sought and found 
the way to us; not the right relation in which 
we must place ourselves to Him 2 but the cove-
nant which He has made once and for all in 
.Jesus Christ. It is this which is \>Tithin th22 Bible. The Word of God is within the Bible. 
Certainly one would look for moral teaching vli thin the 
Bible. One would point to the great moral laws of God as 
delivered to Moses upon the mountain of God as a primary 
example. 23 The teachings of .Jesus upon the mountain would 
t i 1 b t d f l ·t 24 B t B th ed cer a n y e a grea co e o mora ~ y. u ar seem 
to give only the barest attention to these great principles 
of law and instead has given the most weight and emphasis 
upon those points which have always been difficult for Mod-
ern Aiberalism. This, no doubt, was a vestige of his 1ib-
eralistic training. He pointed to the places where God has 
blessed men who committed terrible deeds, or even where men 
were commanded by God to commit them. 
22. Kepler, QQ. ~. , p. 138. 
23. Exodus 20:1-17. 
24. Matthew 5 - 7. 
And in how many phases of morality the 
Bible is grievously wanting! How little 
fundamental information it offers in regard 
to the difficult questions of business life, 
marriage, civilization, and statecraft, with 
which we have to struggle! To mention only 
a single problem, but to us a mortal one: 
hm-r unceremoniously and · constantly "\'Tar is 
waged in the Bible! ••• Time and again the 
Bible gives us the impression that it con-
tains no instructions, counsels, or examples 
whatsoever either for individuals or for 
nations and2~overnments; and the impression is correct. ? 
16 
Of course, also basic to his criticism of the morality of 
the Bible, is the concept which he has which is becoming 
more evident with each quot ation , that the Bible is limi-
ted and relative because it too is a part of the cosmos. 
It is obvious that the great commandments were limited to 
a particular situation and are not applicable to the mod-
ern world . But this is not only t~ue of Biblical ethics 
but of all modern systems. 
The world is full of morality, but where 
have we really got with it? It is always an 
exceptional condition--! had almost said , an 
artificial dislocation of our will. It is no 
new will. Steadily or intermittently, we ap-
ply ourselves to our morality--to our thrift, 
let us say, to thought for our family 7 to ef-ficiency in our vocation, to our patrlotism--
and through it we lift ourselves above our 
o'in real level and that of our fellow men. • • 
Is the unrighteous , self-seeking, capricious, 
world-will really struck at, much less over-
come , by our withdrawing with our morality--
seemingly a little to one side? Is it not our 
very morality which prevents our discerning 
that at a hundred other points we are the more 
firmly fettered to that will? Does it not 
25. Kepler, QQ• ~. , p. 136. 
make us blind and impenitent toward the deep 
real needs of existence? Is it not remark-
able that the greatest atrocities of life--
! think of the capitalistic order and of war--
can justify themselves on purely moral prin-
ciples? The devil may also make use of moral-
ity. He laughs ~t the tower of Babel which 
we erect to him. 6 
17 
Of what value is the Bible? It does not primarily 
teach history , nor can it be used correctly for d o"gma, nor 
can it be deduced to a system of ethics. The truth of the 
Bible, Barth has stated, lies in the fact that it points us 
beyond history, beyond morality, beyond human dogma, to a 
world which man cannot hope to find, the world of God. 27 
What he meant by this statement must be left temporarily un-
til we are able ta probe into Barth's meaning of the Word of 
' 
God. 
E. PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
To summarize the argument or· Barth thus far presented, 
it could be said that Barth believed that everything vlhich 
is not God is limited, relative, and fallible. This applied 
to all that might be termed part of the world which included 
the Bible and human reasoning. There is nothing about the 
world which can possibly give us knowledge of God. Certain-
ty as a part of human attainment is therefore a useless at-
tempt. In the light of what has been gained thus far, one 
would quickly wonder at Barth's own presentation. Is it not 
26. Barth, The \'lord of God and the \vord of Man, p. 18. 
27. Kepler,~· cit., p. 133. 
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also a part of this same world as is nature and the Bible? 
Is it not also a product of the human reason and thus fal-
lible? Startlingly enough, Barth would agree to exactly 
that. Everywhere while reading Barth, one is impressed by 
the scrutiny he has given his mm works. Reflecting upon 
them again and again, he has often been caused to revise 
and even to depart from much of his work in the past. 
Impressive as Barth's work has been1 it is far from being beyond the reach of cr~ti­
cism. Some camp-followers of the movement 
have inclined to forget this, but the master 
himself leaves us in no doubt. He criticizes 
his own statements, often 2 by modifying them. 
"To live is to change, a~ to be perfect is 
to have changed often,tt it has been said; and 
one fact which makes comprehension of his 
thought so difficult is that in detail it 
changes constantly. He warns us vehemently 
against canonizing his results up to date. 
He offers clear principles, definite ~Ssump­
tions, but never a closed system ••• 
Many have criticized Barth because he has claimed that his 
is not a system of thought. On the other hand, Dr. J.L. 
Neve criticized Barth because he ha$ not system enough. At 
the time of the publication of the Credo in 1936, Neve in-
sisted that Barth went through a fundamental change of 
thought and could scareely be recognized as the same indi-
vidual who had published the previous works of Barth. 
Whereas in 1921 Barth virtually heaped rid-
icule on those who look for a Second Coming at 
some distant future, he now speaks of Christ as 
28. Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology 
(London, Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1949f, p. 2l54. 
our "future," our "hope" ••• Only at one fun-
damental point Barth remained the same: he 
still rejects each and ev2~Y acknowledgment 
of a theologia naturalis. ~ 
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Ridicule has often been applied to Barth because of the 
many inconsistencies conta-ined in his writings. But to 
thoroughly understand Barth's relativism, is to understand 
with him that it is perfectly consistent to be inconsistent. 
Barth cannot be understood at all unless it be understood 
that everything he has stated has been stated in a frame-
work of relativism. 
Cornelius Van Til in his criticism of the Barthian 
movement has assumed that Barth does have a system of thought, 
in fact he has so stated in spite of Barth's denials. 30 How-
ever, Barth's definition of a system of thought would be 
different from Van Til's. 
Barth's main charge against other religious thought, 
has been that they have attempted to construct the world 
and God into a closed system of thought. This would in-
clude the Catholics, the Liberal Protestants and the Con-
servative Protestants. He charged that they have attempted 
to marshal all the facts of history and of nature into their 
thought. Thus they have a philosophy of history and of na-
ture. But to deny these assertions, as Barth did, that 
history and nature can be resolved into systematic thought 
29. Neve, A History Qf Christian Thought, II, 177. 
30. Cornelius Van Til, ~ New Modernism (Philadel-
phia~ The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 
1947J, p. viii. 
so that men can kn0\'1 the general pattern of all that has 
happened and all that will happen is not in itself con-
structing another system. The human reason, Barth has 
charged, simply is not adequate to account for all the 
facts. 
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But if one has denied reason, how is it possible for 
there to be any presentation at all? How can one even ex-
press ideas which can be grasped and understood by those 
reading? Some criticism of Barth has been just this ab-
surd. What Barth has denied is not the po"~Jrers of compre-
hension and expression, but man's ability to account for 
all the data which is at his disposal. If one were to ask, 
how could it be true if it did not account for all the facts, 
Barth would reply, it is true because it does not account 
for them for they are of such a nature as not to be ac-
counted by man. This can be done alone by God, and one 
must trust implicitly in Him for all the final solutions. 
This, Barth has stated, is the supreme value of the Bible. 
And it is certain that the Bible, if we 
read it carefully, makes straight for the 
point where one must decide to accept or re+ ject the sovereignty of God~ This is the 
new vrorld v!i thin the Bible • .)l 
Before the examination of the critical point of study 
of Barthian theology, the Word of God, his doctrine of the 
church and of theology should be first understood. In such 
31. Kepler, Contemporary Religi.ous Thought, p. 137. 
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a frame of reference as Barth's it is very difficult to see 
how either can really exist. Unless we understand thorough-
ly their function in the world, the meaning and the purpose 
of the Word of God cannot be understood. 
F. THE CHURCH 
The Church is a part of the world. As much as one might 
wi·sh otherwise, she cannot be extricated from her entangling 
alliances with which she is bound. 
And now the last point, that where the 
Church is~ there it has an aim, the kingdom 
of God. This goal of the Church is bound to 
constitute a continuous restlessness. for the 
men in the Church, whose action stands in no 
relation to the greatness of this goal. We 
must not allow Christian existence, that is 
the existence of the Church, and theological 
existence, to be spoiled by this. It may 
well happen that we might want to drop the 
hand that is put to the plough, when we com-
pare the Church with its goal ••• If we real-
ly hope for the kingdom of God, then we shall 
not be ashamed to discover in the concrete 
congregation the one holy universal Church, 
and then every individual w113 2not be ashamed of his particular confession. 
As a part of the world, the church is hindered in the 
fulfillment of her future goal because she is in a lost and 
damned state. 
We know the Church only in its unlike-
~ to the Kingdom of God. The Church is, 
as we saw, directly constituted by the fact 
that the Kingdom of God has come near in the 
32. Karl Barth, Dogmatics ill Outline, trans. by G.T. 
Thomson (New York, Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 148. 
Epiphany of Jesus Christ, but only near, and 
that we still live in time which is not e-
ternity. The phenomenon of the hiddenness 
of the body of Christ and th~ phenomenon of 
the disunity of the one Church bring tb~t 
fact very clearly before our eyes. • .3j 
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Her weakness is that of utter inability to be effectively 
God-like. But of course this is not what has made the church, 
the church. What has made the church is its relationship to 
Christ. 
• •• The homecoming of her own being, on the 
ground of which alone she actually ventures 
to proclaim, of course means for her the re-
version to her proper being, which transcends 
herself, to Jesus Christ her heavenly Head, 
whom she confronts as His earthly body, bound 
to Him as such, and yet as such distinct from 
Him who possesses the Church in Himself~ but 
not the Church Him in herself, between tlim 
and Her there is no reversible, interchange-
able, relationship as certainly as the re-
latio~~hip of master and servant is no revers-
ible. 
If the Church then is so sinful, so enmeshed with the inhi-
bitions which the world has her bound, why is she in exist-
ence at all? The central duty of the church, her only ex-
cuse for existence, is that of proclamation. 
• • .Both according to the express declara-
tion (Matt. xxviii. 18 f.), and according to 
what we can learn from the New Testament a-
bout the actual practice of the Apostles, 
this commission consists in witnessing by 
means of the preaching of the Gospel and the 
Administration of the Sacraments. No third 
33. Karl Barth, Credo 7 trans. by J. Strathearn HcNab (New York, Charles Scrlbner's Sons, 1936), p. 148. 
34. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Y£Q..!:!! of Q.Q.Q., trans. 
by G.T. Thomson (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1 93 6) ' p • 112. 
action has a place beside these two, which 
are in essence one, the ministerium verbi 
divini ••• It is out of confidence in the 
worth and relevance of this command, it is 
out of the firm assurance that by pure pro-
clamation and by the proper administration 
of the sacraments more is achieved and bet-
ter results are obtained in the solution of just these pressing problems of life than 
by the best-intentioned measures for aid, 
action and enlightenment, that involve our 
stepping outside of the5bounds of this small but mighty domain. • .3 
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Barth has brought to us forcibly that the Church's only rea-
son for existence is the service which it can render to the 
Word of God. She has not been placed here in the world for 
a moral example, not to teach any form of systematized· doc-
trine, but to proclaim. In this act she performs the vital 
function which Christ has commanded her • 
• • • But this human activity of her is of 
course primarily proclamation, and anything 
else than the proper fulfilment of t~~t can-
not be the purpose of dogmatics. • • 
The church, even in her proclamation still remains a 
creature of the world. Through her own power, she has nev-
er been able to proclaim. It is not her OiY.n word she is to 
proclaim, it is the Word of God. And yet as she attempts to 
utter the Word which has been revealed to her by the sover-
eign act of God, it somehow becomes her own word. 
Thus if human language claims to procla-
mation, that can only mean that it claims to 
serve the Word of God, to point to its hav-
35. Barth, ~~' p~ 144. 
36. Barth, ~ Doctrine of ~ ~ Q! ~' p. 94. 
ing previously been spoken through God Him-
self. That is God's Word, that sanctifies 
the human pointer to bear witness to ·Him-
self, this it cannot take to itself. The 
will on man's side here brought in question 
can only be that of accepting a commission. 
It goes decisively with what all true proph-
ecy has discerned, that no man as such can 
possibly utter the Word of God. If man's 
language about God claims to be proclmation, 
it claims to be not grace, but th37service of grace, the means of grace ••• 
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Barth has made it clear that not just any words stated 
in a church are the Words of God. One definite character-
istic of proclamation must be that its language is centered 
in and phrased around the Holy Scripture.38 The proclaimer, 
in the form of homily or exposition, has the task of pre .. 
senting the promises of the Bible. But his purpose is to 
make the promises of the Bible vital, to have bearing upon 
today, and to make them be interpreted in the light of our 
own problem. The scripture then is the proclaimer's pre-
supposition, while the "person called must be ready to make 
the promise given to the Church comprehensible in his own 
words to the men of his time.u39 One can readily recognize 
the relativistic framework of this contention. In fact it 
is this view of reality which has made proclamation needful 
if one were to accept Barth's point of view. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
l..Q1g.. ' p. 57. 
l12iQ.. ' p • 64. 
Ibid. , 
- · 
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G. DOGMATICS 
Even as the principle task of the Church is proclama-
tion, her principle theology is dogmatics. Proclamation in 
Barth's theology is prior to dogmatics, and as it has been 
shown that proclamation and exegesis have vital bearing on 
one another, so one might say that exegesis is prior to dog-
matics. But because exegesis involves the human element, 
there is always the danger that exegesis will no longer be 
exegesis, but the proclamation of the proclaimer. Because 
of the danger of this imposition of human ideas upon the 
Word of God, proclamation· must be carefully scrutinized to 
ascertain its usefulness to the service of the Word of God. 
As the science of dogmatics is examined briefly, Barth's 
definition of dogmatics should be carefully compared to those 
of other theologians, either favorably or unfavorably. It is 
evident that Barth would disagree radically with the defini-
tion of dogmatics which Strong has given us • 
• • • 'the systematizing of the doctrines as 
expressed in the symbols of the Church, to-
gether with the grounding of these in the 
Scriptures, and the exhibition, so f~~0as may be, of their rational necessity. · 
Barth's main disagreement as one could easily see, would be 
in the effort to prove the rational necessity of certain doc-
trines. Though doctrine might explain the certain phenomenon, 
40. James Strong, Systematic Theology, quoted in H. 
Orton Wiley, Christian Theology (Kansas City, Beacon 
Hill Press, 1949) I, 28. 
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it most certainly cannot be demonstrated as a rational ne-
cessity, for even the theology of dogmatics cannot explain 
its necessity, for it is of another i.rorld. Lange's defini-
tion of dogmatics would meet with scarcely -more approval by 
Barth. 
• •• It is the science which presents to our 
notice the material obtained by exegesis and 
history in an organized and systematic form, 
representing the sum of the truth of the 
Christian faith in organic connection ~!th the 
facts of religious consciousness ••• ' 
There is in this definition an attempt tog ather meaning 
from history which Barth would state as having no meaning. 
Barth's definition of dogmatics is as follows: 
As a theological discipline, dogmatics 
is the scientific test to which the Chris-
tian Church puts herself regarding the lan-
guage about God which is peculiar to her.~2 
It is evident that in one respect at least, Barth has re-
turned to a more healthy emphasis. This is the stress which 
he must place upon the importance of doctrine as he also has 
stressed exegesis. As a science, Barth stated that dogmat-
ics must lay an accountable path to its conclusions, but on 
the other hand it must not submit to the tests 1.vhich are 
valid for the other sciences. It is the other world science 
and cannot undergo empirical proofs of laboratory tests as 
do the other sciences. 
41. H. Orton Wileyi Christian Theology (Kansas City, 
Beacon Hill Press, 9~9) I, 29. 
42. Barth, The Doct:tine of ih£ Word Qf. God, p. 1. 
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Though Bartn expressly stated that dogmatics has for 
its presupposition the ascertainability of truth by the hu-
man mind, t his in no way guarantees the fact that truth has 
actually been found. The Church knows the truth only as an 
act of faith, in the revelation of God which He has and does 
commit to her, but the very nature· of this revelation is 
such that it cannot be held nor can it be transmitted with-
out the laying •on of unholy hands. 
As an inquiry dogmatics presupposes that 
the proper content of Christian language about 
God must be known humanly. Christian language 
must be investigated as to its conformity to 
Christ. In this conformity it is by no means 
presented to us obviously or free from diffi-
culties. The finally and adequately given di-
vine answer is the co~terpart of the human 
question which retains its faithfulness ·: ·.· 
throughout unwearied, honest advance, of the 
cry that is sincere even amid the loftiest 
attainments, 'not as though I had already 
attainedl' True, dogmatics receives the 
measure 1.vi th which it measures in an act of 
human appropriation. Therefore it must be an 
inquiry. It knows the light that is perfect 
in itself, that discovers all in a flash. 
But it knows it only in the prism of this act, 
which, however 2 radically or existentially it 
may be regarded, is a human act, offering in 
itself no sort of surety for the correctness 
of the appropriation in question, being rath-
er fallible and therefore itself in need of 
criticism and revision, of repeated and ever 
closer re-testing. The creaturely form which 
God's revealing action comes to take in dog-
matics is therefore not that of kno,vledge 
attained in a flash, which it would have to 
be to correspond to the divine gift, but a 
laborious advance from one partial human in-
sight to another, intending but by no means 
guaranteeing an 'advance!'~3 
43. ~., p. 14. 
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Barth has continually emphasized that the theologian as \oJell 
as the proclaimer must have experienced the truth which is 
known only by faith. But in this world which cannot, at 
present at least, know the truth in its entirety, and can-
not even be certain of any of its truths about God, theology 
is on very uncertain gz:uunQ.s. Having knovm this truth obtained 
in the flash, it is by no means certain that this same truth 
is still present when human effort attempts to use it in 
ascertaining the truth of Christian proclamation. 
The necessity of dogmatics is found in the nature of 
the church, because she is a sinful creature of this 1vorld. 
It is found in the very nature of proclamation itself, be-
cause it is the human publishing of the Divine \'lord. The 
need for dogmatics is found in the very nature of dogmatics 
itself, as a human effort to establish truth, a truth which 
is established not in stability, but in an environment in 
which all is relative • 
• • • It cannot--at this early stage we may say 
so--have in view a system of Christian truth. 
All else apart, that would mean that it had 
the power to criticise all the Church procla-
mation ever made, and to put the whole of a 
corrected Church proclamation finally befo~~ 
the public. That i~ simply cannot do ••• 
H. THE WORD OF GOD 
The heart of Barth's message is the Word of God. In 
·44. Ibid., p. 88. 
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the discussion of the church, of proclamation, and of dog-
matics or theology this has been evident. It is the Word 
of God which calls the church into exstence , for without 
the revelatory efforts of God to man, there would and could 
be no Church. It is the Word of God which forms the basis 
of proclamation, for without this basis, proclamation be-
comes simply human utterance. It is the Word of God which 
arouses the theologian to a closer scrutiny of the Church's 
proclamation in its effort to arrive at the true meaning of 
its message. 
The question which continually haunts everyone who has 
ever studied Barth is just what is the Word of God? Accord-
ing to Barth, it is God's Divine operation upon man. It is 
God's speaking to man. Because it is God speaking, not man 
speaking to himself nor any other part of the cosmos, it is 
different from all other events. It is the penetration of 
the Divine Will into this finite world. It happens not be-
cause of man's upsurge of feeling, nor because man feels 
the necessity for ru1new set of dogmas, values, or directions, 
but because God Wills it to happen. 
Due to the foreign nature of the Word of God, the im-
position of the Absol ute upon the Relative, the Word of God 
can only hold for the moment. This has not been caused by 
God's limitation, but because we ourselves are the limited 
ones, unable to grasp that which is Eternal. So when the 
Absolute speaks, finite men hear, they know His voice, but 
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it is only for the moment • 
• • • God and His Word are not presented to us 
in the 1.vay in \vhich natural and historical en-
tities are presented to us. We can never by 
retrospect, and so by anticipation, fix what 
God is or what His vlord is. He must always 
repeat that to us and always repeat it afresh. 
But there is no human avrareness corresponding 
to this divine utterance. In God's utterance 
there come to be a meeting and a communion be-
tween His nature and man, but not an absorption 
of this nature into man's awareness. There 
can only be a const~pt repitition of fresh di-
vine utterance ••• ' 
In the final analysis to the question of how one can know 
who is speaking, the ansvrer which Barth has given is obvious. 
One can only know because God lets us know it is He. It is 
God's Word because He says so. It is God's mystery. 
The \vord of God, as man knows it, has always been in 
three forms, the \vri tten Word, Proclamation, and in the 
Sacraments. Yet the Word of God is not written, is not 
Proclamation nor the Sacraments. The Word of God, though 
from a different atmosphere than the \vorld, al 'I}Jays occurs 
in conjunction '.ri th a worldly act. But it is not that act. 
This dualistic dogma can be found throughout Barth -- in 
Christ; in the Church, and in the Word of God. But Procla-
t. 
mation is the Word of God as God speaks through it; the 
Scriptures are the tvord of God as God speaks through them; 
and the Sacraments are the Word of God as God uses them to 
speak to us. 
45. ~.' p.l49. 
The language of God is and remains God's 
mystery above all in its worldliness (in the 
sense of belonging to the world: and so here 
passim). When God speaks to man, this happen-
ing is never so marked off from the rest of 
what happens that it might not promptly be 
also interpreted as a part of this other hap-
pening. The Church in fact is also a socio-
logical entity with definite historical and 
structural features. Preaching in fact is 
also an address. S.acrament in fact is also 
a symbol in compromising proximity to all 
other possible symbols. The Bible in fact 
is also the document for the history of the 
religion of a tribe in Nearer Asia and of 
its Hellenistic offshoot. Jesus Christ in 
fact is also the Rabbi of Nazareth histori-
cally so difficult to get information about, 
and when it is got, one whose activity is so 
easily a little commonplace alongside more 
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than one other founder of a religion and even 
alongside many later representatives of His own 
•religion.• And let us not forget that the-
ology in fact, so surely avails itself of 
human speech, is also a philosophy or a con-
glomerate of all sorts of philosophy. Even 
the Biblical miracles do not burst these 
walls of worldliness. From the moment they 
took place they were interpreted otherwise 
than as proofs of the Word of God, and admit-
tedly they may ever and anon be interpreted 
in a very different sense. The veil is thick. 
We do not possess the Word of God other~~se 
than in the mystery of its worldliness. 
When one has examined the Bible, as Barth would see it, he 
then would see a purely fallible human book. From God's 
viewpoint, that which is contained there is a human attempt 
to reproduce the Divine Counsel and Wisdom as uttered to 
man. From man's viewpoint, the Bible is but a fruitless 
history of a wandering tribe • 
• • • Literally we are, therefore, concerned 
with human attempts to repeat and reproduce 
46. Ibid. p. 188. 
in human thoughts and expressions, this Word 
of God in definite human situations, e.g. in 
respect of the complications of Israel's po-
litical position midway between Egypt and 
Babylon, or of the error:sand confusions in 
the Ch~7stian Church at Corinth between A.D. 
50-60. 
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Though only a human book, the Bible is of the utmost impor-
tance. This is because, it can become the Word of God. God 
is absolute sovereign as Barth has seen Him, .and cannot be 
bound by any ties. As He chooses, He can and does make the 
Bible the \-lord of God. Thus, Barth has explained, God is 
not bound by His Word, but His v/ord is bound to Him. He 
chooses as He wills , and make s vital as He sees fit. No 
human fears, no human desires, can ever make or remove the 
Word of God • 
• • • It takes place as an event, when and where 
the word of the Bible becomes God's Word, i.e. 
when and where the word of the Bible functions 
as the word of a witness, when and where John's 
finger points not in vain but really pointedly, 
when and \vhere by means of its word vle also 
succeed in seeing and h earing what he saw and 
heard, Therefore, where the Word of God is an 
event, revelation and the Bibl~8are one in fact, and word for word one at that. 
Of equal impor:tance, and side by side with its ability to be-
come the Word of God , stands the fact that the Bible is the 
symbol of the Word of God. It proclaims the living message 
to the Church - - God has spoken. As the record of God's 
speaking in the past, it holds out the future hope that God 
47. Ibido, P• 127. 
48. Ibid. -
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will again speak. Buoyed by this hope, the Church can be 
confident that she will always have a mission and a message 
in this world, and that God will not leave her comfortless, 
but will return again unto her.49 ~ 
Thirdly, the unity of the Bible assures us of the unity 
of the Church and of proclamation.5° This has been one of 
Barth's most difficult concepts to comprehend. The unity 
of the Bible does not guarantee that there will not be con-
tradictions, nor does it guarantee that the Church will be-
come united in one faith, for the Bible itself is ful l of 
contradictions. The unity here spoken of, can only be the 
unity of the principle behind the Word of God. That is, it 
will always be God speaking. ·- -:that the Church \vill ab.,rays 
be the recipient, and that the method of givenness and the 
method of reception will ab>~ays be united with those of old. 
In guaranteeing the unity of proclamation, he could not mean 
that the church will ever bear a united message to the world, 
but only that it will come from God, hence united. In the 
light of man's inadequacy, it could only be a unity of God's 
understanding, not of man's. 
God has never spoken to man but in the veiledness of 
the flesh. His Word is cloaked by Proclamation, or by the 
word of the Bible. His supreme revalatory act , Christ, was 
veiled in the man, Jesus. This veiling causes a warp of 
49. Ibid., p. 124. 
50. Ibid., p. 131. 
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the message so that it can be misunderstood or even missed 
by man. Barth has stated that t his cosmos is in contradic-
tion to God, and that any revelatory act through it must be 
made in spite of it, and not because of it.51 Why then, 
does God reveal Himself in the flesh, or only in the veiled-
ness of the cosmos? 
••• The facts are that God Himself veils 
himself and in the very process -- which is 
why we should not dream of intruding into 
the mystery-- unveils Himself. It is good 
for us that God acts exactly as He does, 
and it could be only fatal for us if He 
acted otherwise, if He were manifest to us 
in the way we should hold correct, directly 
and without veil, without worldliness or 
only in that harmless transparent form of 
it analogia entis. It would not be greater 
love and mercy, it \vould be the end of us 
and the end of all things if the lvord v.rere 
addressed to us thus.?2 
Reason again breaks down if one attempts to understand this 
mystery of God. One accepts it because he believes that God 
has ordained it, that in this way all is best for us. 
But in our rational breakdown, one is even more help-
less than the mer e impossibility to understand God's reason 
for veiledness. Man cannot achieve the unveiling of the 
Word from its worldly content, so that to grasp God's Word, 
does not mean · .that men must be able to differentiate one 
from the other. If man attempts to grasp the Word of God 
by reason, he would see it first in its worldly form, as an 
51. Ibid., p. 189. 
52. Ibid., p. 192. 
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event, which would be to think materially. Then man would 
conceive of the Word as spiritual, as full of Divine content. 
This would be thinking Idealistically. To be able to reason 
a synthesis would mean to attain the very miracle of God 
Himself in the mystery of His Veiledness in His Unveiling • 
• • • In faith and in the thought of faith it 
is not a case of thinking this synthesis. 
Faith means rather recognising that this syn-
thesis cannot be achieved, committing it to 
God and seeking to find it in God. By find-
ing it in God we acknowledge that we cannot 
do it in ourselves and so can neither achieve 
it in a definite attitude in life nor think 
it systematically. But by committing it to 
God and seeking it in Him, we do find· it, we 
hear the '\¥hole, the real word of God, i.e. 
now the divine content in its worldly form, 5 now in the worldly form the divine content ••• 3 
In spite of our inability to comprehend its mysteries, 
the Word of God speaks to us a new message, something which 
man could not have knownotherwise. Its message meets us 
where we are, in the midst of the human situation and speaks 
the answer to our perplexity. It comes home to us more than 
any other experien~e of life , even more than death itself. 
It renews again the relationship which man has lost, because 
God's Word is personal. It is everywhere bound to the per-
son of Christ, and as the Living Word , Incarnate, He is the 
message to us. In our desparate sinful state, this is in-
deed welcome news. Our human effort has led us to despair, 
but God's Word gives us strength to carry onward. 
53. Ibid., p. 200. 
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Man can never hope to escape the bondage of sin. This 
thought of faith, if we might call it a thought of faith, 
is a justified and sanctified thought, but this does not 
mean that in any way man is less defective, or even the 
thought is less defective • 
• • • As such, and therefore without becoming 
different of and in itself, it is as the 
thought of faith, a justified and sanctified 
thought. But justification and sanctifica-
tion by fa~th, means justification and sanc-
tification by the object of faith, from God ' s 
side, without therefore the man of faith or 
his thought ceasing to be less defective. 
And because we cannot give ourselves faith, 
we cannot, therefore, by our thinking create 
for ourselves this justification and sancti-
fication, cannot achieve Christianity in our 
thought or even merely establish its presence 
in ourselves or in others, can only believe in 
it as God's grace: believe, because of the 
fact that our thought from either side is 
faced with a wall which we can neither throw 
down nor make transparent , i.e. because of the 
unchristianity which cannot disown in our 
thought considered in and of itself. Thus 
believing now means hearing the divine con-
tent of the Word of God, although absolutely 
nothin~4but the worldly form is discernable by us. 
In summary, it will be observed that Barth's system 
presents a complete breakdown of the human reason. It can-
not adequately give t o bme a complete philosophy for in the 
midst of life one soon becomes aware of antithesis which can-
not be solved. The resolution of the antithesis are known 
only to God Himself ·which must be accepted by faith. In 
this light, the relationship of faith and reason is purely 
54. Ibid., p. 200. 
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negative. Though God has given to man fleeting glimpses of 
light which reveal in a moment the solution to his dilemma, 
the glimpses themselves do not present a rational solution, 
but one which must be taken by faith alone. By faith alone, 
through the instrumentality of the Word of God , has man been 
able to see beyond the antinomies of existence into the world 
of God. The attestation of t h i s fact ha s been given to man 
by that which is recorded in the Bible. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF EMIL: BRUNNER 
A. BIOGRAPHY 
Little information is available concerning the life of 
Emil Brunner, He was born in 1889 in Winterthur, Switzer-
land and grew to become one of the leading theologians of 
the Swiss Evangelical Church. Since 1924, with the exception 
of a brief interlude as guest professor at the Princeton 
Theological Seminary in 1938, he has been professor of Sys-
tematic Theology in Zurich, Switzerland. 1 At the present 
time, Doctor Brunner is under appointment to the new Japan 
International Christian University, located near Tokyo. 2 
As young men·, Barth and Brunner, together with Eduard 
Thurneysen, constituted a group of young pastors in adjacent 
parishes in Switzerland. In the years directly after the 
war, these three in their study and discussions together made 
the discovery of the real meaning of the Word of God.3 This 
moment became kno'Yn as that time when the Dialectical The-
1. W(alter) A(lexander) \.V(hitehouse), "Emil Brunner, 11 
Chamber's Encyclopedia (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1950), B, 141. 
2. "Dr. Brunner to Join Japan Christian University 
Faculty,'' The Telescope-Messenger, November 1, 1952, 
p. 4. 
3. Emil Brunner ~and Man,trans. with an intra. 
by David Cairns ~London, Student Christian Movement 
Press , 193 6) , p. 3 5. 
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ology was given birth. Together, these three men labored to 
spread their new found philosophy. Needless to say, it faced 
tremenduous opposition. Later, the three old friends of 
earlier days began to find divergences in their theologies 
and have chosen to go their separate ways. 
B. BARTH AND BRUNNER 
Before undertaking a thor.ough discussion of Emil Brun-
ner•s philosophy, a comparison of his approach with that of 
Karl Barth should be made. Barth's viewpoint is primarily 
that of the· minister.4- As a liberal minister, he pondered 
the problem of the authority of the pulpit. He realized 
that as he spoke, his words of advice, comfort and exhorta-
tion were eagerly grasped by the members of his congregation. 
These were people who were hard pressed by their everyday 
problems. Life and its meaning left them baffled and con-
fused. But who was he, that he should offer them these words 
from the pulpit? Was not his word only that of a man'? \vas 
he not a man just as they, 't>Tho was just as perplexed by the 
problems of the world? Why then did he presume to stand 
behind the sacred desk to issue advice and comfort when he 
too \.vas in need? Barth came forth to meet this problem of 
every liberal minister with the positive affirmation that 
he spoke The Word of God.5 
4. Aubrey, QQ.• . cit., p. 89. 
5. Cf. Ante., p. 29. 
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Brunner's dilemma is not so much concerned with the 
problem of the minister, as that of the apologist. It is 
not the message which the church must carry to its own con-
stituents, but the message which she must carry against 
those who attack her. 
The approach of Barth to theology is from 
the problem of what to preach. BrQnner is a the-
ological professor and sees the problem through 
the eyes of an i~tellectual facing the scienti-
fic, humanistic temper of the moderns, and throw-
ing dm.-m the gauge to them. This is an important 
difference; because Brunner is forced to set his 
theology in relation not merely to the hu~an 
needs of a parish but also tb th~ ?intellectual 
needs of6those seeking a reorientation of modern culture. 
One cannot conclude, however, that Brunner is not concerned 
with the ministry of the Church, nor Barth ,,.Ji th the philo-
sophical problems of the Church. The emphasis has merely 
been placed on a particular aspect of a total situation 
which both have recognized. There was merely a divergence 
of approach to the critical question of certainty. This 
does not, of course, preclude the possibility of their ar-
riving at the same conclusions. 
Another comparison which might be made between the two 
writers is that of style. Though not necessary for the for-
mal interpretation of their writings, it does give keys in-
to the type of character behind the writings. The diver-
gence of style is great enough that it can readily be seen 
6. Aubrey, QQ. cit., p. 89. 
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although one is limited to reading the manuscripts only in 
translation. Of the two, Barth has given the impression of 
the profounder thinker, Brunner that of the best writer. 
Brunner's style might be characterized as lucid. Barth 
himself has spoken of Brunner's "uncanny clarity. 11 7 Brun-
ner's attack is relatively methodical. No new step is un-
dertaken until thorough discussion has been concluded upon 
the previous step which formed the fb.undational thought. 
Barth, on the other hand, gave the impression of grappling 
with ideas and problems too profound to be exactly expressed 
in words. Again and again, he has returned to the same sub-
ject in an endeavor to better express the idea which he in-
tended. This is not only evident in the method of \-triting, 
but in the constant revision to "~:lhich he subjects his 1t1orks. 8 
The emphasis upon the relativistic environment in 1..rhich 
the individual isfound was not so great in Brunner as in 
Barth. However, Brunner has not ignored the relativistic 
attitude of modern scholars but has welcomedit as a sign of 
the thinkers' admission of the inability of the human rea-
son to govern all truth. 
• • .The profound upheavals of the last few 
years, the perception of the nature of a rad-
ically nihilistic intellectual outlook, have 
today made many people more inclined to listen 
to a clear witness to a revelation which is 
willing to recognize the legitimate claims of 
reason and culure. The relative attitude to-
ward the whole question of truth is not always 
7. Brunner, God and Man, p. 36. 
·8. Cf. Ante., p. 18. 
merely the desire to doubt, but very often, 
and particularly today it is the admission 
of the insufficiency of human knowledge, and--
in so far as this is the case--it is the sign 
of a secret longing for a truth which lies be-
yond the human plane ••• 9 
C. PRIMAL SIN 
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Brunner has visualized that all men are under the yoke 
of sin. The primal sin, as it afflicts all men, is the il-
lusion which man has concerning his own autonomy. This au-
tonomy, it should be noted, never has been a fact, but merely 
an illusion. This illusion has manifested itself in the sub-
jection of all types of data to the human reason. It is the 
desire of every individual to govern the validity of every 
concept by his own reason. He alone has the only right to 
reach an objective decision. This, Brunner has declared, 
is the essence of sin • 
• • • But the claim of Christian revelation 
goes further than this: through the revela-
tion reason is placed in the wrong, namely, 
in all her attempts to comprehend and grasp 
the Divine which necessarily spring from rea-
son ••• But it is precisely this limitation 
which reason, or rather the rational man, 
does not like. Reason wishes to remain the 
supreme court of appeal. Reason does not 
wish to acknowledge the judgment passed on 
it by a unique fact. The will and the pride 
of reason rebel against faith ••• Hence the 
real stumbling-block is not the theoretical 
paradox but the moral humiliation.lO 
It is, then, a fundamental axiom that God has granted 
9. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, trans. by 
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 
1946), p. 7. 
10. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, trans. by Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1927), p. 43. 
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to man knowledge of certain things. This was in spite of 
the fact that man's faculties have been darkened by sin. 
By the very nature of things, that is the nature of the 
world and the nature of the reason, man can know certainty • 
• • • The works of God in the Creation are 
placed before the eyes of all, and reason is 
the endowment common to all men, and that which 
places them on a higher plane than that oc-
cupied by all the other creatures. The ob-
jective process of revelation, or the ob-
jective means of revelation, and the sub-
jective capacity to receiye revelation are 
made for each other ••• ~ 
But it is the limitation of the human reason which man 
has refused to see. This is, in actuality, merely the self-
deifying of man. This act, however, has not been committed 
by men in the name of reason any more than it has been 
committed by men in the name of religion and faith. In 
fact, one gets the impression that Brunner has looked more 
hopefully to those who do not thus err in the name of faith. 
An examination of the critical points on which Brunner be-
lieved the Church had erred should help to throw additional 
light on that problem. 
The Church, in her interpretation of the meaning of 
"faith," has lost that which is vital for the maintenance 
of her existence. The reason for this mistake can be found 
in the Church's response to heresy. Because of false doc-
trines, the church found it necessary to define who was and 
who was not an unbeliever. Upon everyone who was formally 
11. Brunner , Revelation and Reason, p. 68. 
taken into the Orthodox Church, a set of carefully prepared 
dogma was imposed. To this he must acquiesce or be stigma-
tized as a heretic. Gradually the true object of faith was 
dropped and dogma substituted. 
A "believer" is no longer , as in the Ne1<1 
Testament a person who has been claimed and 
transformed by Jesus Christ, but a person who 
accepts what the Church offers him as divine-
ly revealed doctrine, since he is aware that 
either the Bible or the doctrinal authority 
of the Church constitutes an authority to lvhich 
he must submit without question.l2 
The Church has also grieviously erred in her doctrine 
of the Bible. This error occurred in the Protestant churches 
in their desire for surety against the Roman Catholic charges 
of heresy. The Bible became an outward sign and symbol to 
which they could refer in defense of Protestant doctrine. 
Gradually the Bible became merely a. set of doctrines rather 
than a real guide to vital faith. Faith was then trans-
ferred to it, rather than the true object for which faith 
was intended • 
• • • The habit of regarding the written word, 
the Bible, as the 11V/ord of God 11 exclusively--
as is the case in the traditional equation of 
the "word" of the Bible 'ltli th the 11Word of God 11--
an error which is constantly on the verge of 
being repeated--is actually a breach of the 
Second Commandment: it is the deification of 
a creature, bibliolatry.l3 
Another mistake of the Church, which has a very close 
12. Ibid., p. 9. 
13. Ibid., p. 120. 
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connection with the preceeding two, has been her misuse of 
doctrine. With her doctrines , the Church has attempted to 
construct an entire world view. That is , the church has 
subjected herself to the illusion that all reality, includ-
ing God Himself can be known in a rationally ordered set 
of doctrines. This has come about through the unholy wed-
lock of Christian thought to Greek philosophy. Thus God 
can be proved to be from the order of nature around him. 
To Brunner, this is a supreme delusion. 
The self-confidence of the reason is no-
where more evident than in tUe attempt to 
prove the existence of God. 
D. FAITH AND REASON 
The heart of Brunner's criticism can be found in his 
meaning of the word, 11faith.n His criticism of the Church 
was basically the fact that "faith" has no longer the mean-
ing of "faith," and has been changed to reason. Instead of 
faith in God, Christianity now asserted it has faith in 
reason because by that method she can know God. Instead of 
faith in God, dogma has been substituted, particularly as 
found in the doctrinization of the Bible. Thus the church 
had faith in a book, not in God. 
To make the distinction clear between faith and know-
ledge, Brunner has set forth the ways in which faith differs 
from reason. But though faith differs from reason, it was 
14. Ibid., p. 338. 
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only through faith that reason could preserve and maintain 
its true validity. 
Revealed knowledge is poles apart from 
rational knowledge ••• Jesus Christ is not 
the enemy of reason, but only of the irra-
tional arrogance of those who pride them-
selves on their intellect, and of the ir-
rational self-sufficience of reason ••• In 
spite of this, however, it remains our duty 
to inquire into the positive relation be-
tween the two, precisely because1~e must make this contradiction intelligibl~. 
The process of reason, as it is related to this world, 
has given to man during the process of history, a gradual 
command over his objects of knowledge. Thus man has gradu-
ally been able to make this world an easier place to live 
through the progress of science. Revealed knowledge, how-
ever, is in direct contrast to this type of knowledge, 
••• Natural acquisition of secular knowledge 
makes us masters of that which we know ••• 
God through His revelation, becomes Lord over 
me; He makes me His property; by this very 
fact I become free, an~6indeed only then do I develop my true "I". 
Reason has enabled man to accumulate a vast amount of 
data concerning the world around him. Many men of today 
are acquainted with almost every aspect of life as it is 
known in this world. But revealed knowledge, which comes 
by faith, is not of this nature. 
• • .The knowledge of revelation does not add 
to my knowledge; it .does not make me "educated"; 
15. Ibid., p. 11. 
16. Ibid., p. 26. 
it does not enlarge my "sphere," but it 
transforms !!lli myselfl it changes the one 
who receives it ••• 7 
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The knowledge of faith is in antithesis with the or-
dinary knovrledge of reason for still another reason. Ra-
tional knowledge is gained in a solitary process. When man 
has finally mastered a particular subject of study, this 
mastery is his alone. There is no sharing of the actual 
learning process because he cannot learn for someone else. 
True, he could share his new found learning, but the one 
with whom he shared must likewise learn for himself or it 
would not be his own. Brunner has stated that revealed 
knm.,rledge is a process that is exactly opposite to this one • 
• • • In revelation, however, the exact opposite 
takes place: since God makes Himself kno~to 
me 1 I am no longer solitaryi the knowledge of God creates community, and 1ndeed community 8 is precisely the aim of the divine revelation. 1 
E. ORIGINAL REVELATION 
The presupposition to revelation, is sin. If there 
were no sin, there \'v'Ould be no necessity for revelation. 
Though sin is and can be a state, that is, the state of be-
ing far distant from God, primarily sin is the act of re-
jection of God. This act of wilful disobedience is not 
static, in other words, but it is dynamic • 
• • • Sin, fundamentally, is the revolt of the 
creature against the Creator, the attempt of 
17. Ibid. 
18. ~bid., p. 26. 
the creature to escape from dependence on 
God, in order not to be under God, and re-
lated to God, but to be without God, that 
is , not only to be conditionally, but un-
conditionally free ••• 19 
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The presupposition to sin, is original knowledge of God. 
If man is to turn away from God , must he not know from whom 
he turns? This knowledge of sin, of lost possession domi-
nates man's life. He may and pr obably will do his best to 
ignore his lost condition, but ever again is he reminded of 
his desperation • 
• • • Sin, however, is a conception connoting 
personal action, active p_ersonality. Sin 
means that I am in wrong relation to God and 
that I have torn myself away from an origi-
nal divinely given possibility. Sin means, 
then, neither a "not-yet" as evolutionism 
says, nor a "not-n0\1 11 as the moralists say: 
it is a "no-longer." It is an alienation, 
a disrupted relation, a having left the Fa-
ther ••• Guilt, as a necessary aspect of e-
vil, presupposes that the original fellow-
ship with God is broken. Something has hap-
pened over which we have no longer any con-
trol; and the damage is beyond our ability 
to repair. Only when sin is defined as guilt 
is evil comprehended in its personal form. 
It is not something that is wrong between God 
and myself. Evil is not ~something between 
God and man; it is myself in the 1.vrong posi-
tion. When this position is taken I cannot 
change it. Guilt means the loss of ability 
to return to my original place. Evil is ta-
ken really seriously only when it is understood 
as guilt. 20 
Hovrever, if one supposes that this break with the 
19. Ibid., p. 50. 
20. Emil Brunner, The Theology of Crisis (Ne'l.v :. York, 
Charles :Scribneli's Sons, 1929), p. 51+:-
49 
Father can be conceived of as an historical event, an oc-
currence which can be dated and knm.·m by the sinner, he is 
mistaken. Without revelation, and its knowledge, man can 
be almost blissfully unaware of any sense of guilt. But 
when God has spoken, when one has been confronted by that 
which has been revealed, then he suddenly becomes aware of 
the intense span which has separated him from God~ 
••• Hence the converse is also true; the more 
personal is our relation to God, the more plain-
ly do sin and guilt stand out. The obstacle 
which blocks the v1ay, the great bomliler on the 
path, m.ves its weight to the divine nearness, 
through which guilt is maintained, so that it 
cannot be dispelled by any specious arguments: 
thus our sense of guilt2is due to the presence of the Divine Holiness. 
According to Brunner, man has been separated from all 
other creatures by the fact of responsibility. The core of 
human personality is not rationality but responsibility. To 
a limited extent, psychologists have demonstrated that ani-
mals do have intelligence, but none but man feels guilt. To 
think of God, is for man to feel his own sinfulness and guilt. 
He is ever impressed, if he chooses to think ·seriously, of 
the impassible span which has separated him from God. But 
every rational act of man reflects his responsibility, his 
relationship to God. Man cannot think of number without 
also the thought of infinite number. He cannot state the 
truth without thinking in turn of absolute truth. This does 
21. Brurmer, The Mediator, p. 320. 
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not mean that simply because of the awareness of reason to 
God, that man can really know God through reason. Reason 
simply has made man constantly aware of his own responsibility • 
• • • The reason is not God; but vlhat it is and 
does can be understood only in the light of the 
original revelation. Man's reason therefore is 
also the cause of his eternal unrest, due to 
the fact that it is derived from God and has 
been made for God. It is precisely the activi-
ty of the reason which is the unmistakable sign 
that man comes from God, and from a divine re-
velation, even when the activity of the reason 
takes the form of denying God.22 
In the above quotation, Brunner has man involved in one 
of his many paradoxes. Though man has attempted to make rea-
son supreme, it is precisely this rational activity which 
constantly has reminded him of his guilt. Reason, in its 
very attempt to make itself supreme, does in that very act~ 
indicate tha t it is derived, hence not God. This is called 
by Brunner, original revelation. 
Original revelation is closely connected with Brunner's 
concept of revelation in creation. Revelation has ah1ays 
been apparent to men in the works of God. It was most rea-
sonable for him to assume God from creation, but it did not 
lead to a knowledge of God. This has not been the fault of 
the revelation, but the fault lay in man. Hence, through 
general revelation, man's responsibility has been pressed 
upon him. Having known of God, man refused to use his know-
ledge aright until God has spoken personally to him through 
I 
22. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 56. 
special revelation. 
Thus we see clearly that while the Bible 
teaches a general revelation, or a revelation 
in the Creation it does not teach "natural 
theology. 11 ••• Rather, it is an integral part 
of the sin of man that the kno\vledg e of God 
which begins to dawn upon him through revela-
tion is suppressed by him, so that the reve-
lation which God gives him for knowledge of 
Himself become5 the source of the vanity of 
idolatry ••• 2 
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There has ever been only one true theology. But true the-
ology can only arise in an environment conducive to its 
growth. This is a Christian environment. That atmosphere 
of which knm.dedge must partake, Brunner has stated is the 
attitude of belief • 
• • • Dogmatic thinking is not only thiruring 
about the faith, it is believing thinking. 
There may be various \·Ja;,rs of solving the 
problem of the theory of knowledge which 
this raises: this, in any case, is the claim 
which dogmatics makes \vithout which its ef-
fort ceases to be dogmatics, and it ~~comes 
the neutral science of religion. • • 
As one examines these statements, it becomes evident 
that although right thinking is possible, right thinking is 
not probable. The man untouched by the Word of God, naturally 
suppressed the message of general revelation, while dogmatics 
was only possible in the attitude of "believing thinking." 
This perversion of reason has been caused by the fall of man. 
This faculty has remained, to deny the fact would be absurd, 
for through this alone, could man be made a truly responsible 
23. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 65. 
24. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, 
trans. by Olive Wyoi11"Philadelphia, The ~vest­
minster Press, 1950), p. 5. 
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creature. What man has lost, is the moral direction which 
reason originally had, that is, the right use of the reason. 
The Old Testament understanding of the Image of God 1.,rhich 
considered the reason in itself did not consider the i mage 
as lost, for that is what makes man, man. The New Testa-
ment, considering the moral natt~e of the Image, has con-
cluded that the Image has been lost • 
• • • All that is left of the divinely created 
nature of man is the rational nature, but not 
the right attitude of the reason, in conform-
ity with the will of God. Thus, in point of 
fact, the imago, understood in the Old Testa-
ment sense, is merely2~ "Relic" of the origi-nal, total imago ••• 
One might 'i.vell ask, what is the content of general 
revelation. Brunner has answered this by stating that man 
does have a concept of law. Human existence without law, 
without an idea of r ·ight and '\•Trong coupled together with a 
moral idea \vould be impossible. That the idea of right and 
wrong often differs in cultures throughout the world is not 
important. What is important is the fact of lavl. 
Therefore, the moment that human con-
sciousness exists the problem of ethics is 
raised, the question of right conduct must 
be faced. Further, it is also impossible 
to avoid setting up a principle of order, 
a definite scale of values to express pre-
ference, \olhatever theoretical position may 
be afterwards adopted towards this princi-
ple. For we can.not make the smallest deci-
sion save in the light of a superior purpose 
25. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 70. 
a norm, a commandment; indeed, we cannot avoid 
having one supreme idea of purpose and order--
although this may be still very indistinct, 
and we may be only dimly a\vare of it ••• 2o 
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Natural man, however, not only has this "Thou Shalt" of 
Kantian ethics, but also, the "Therefore I Can." Again the 
illusion of autonomous man has reared its ugly head. The 
distorted natural ethic has failed to really note the heart 
of the divine message of general revelation, that man is 
sinner. Not only did natural reason fail to notice the 
real message, in the very act of misconstruing the message, 
he committed even grosser sin. Basically, the natural man 
thinks he is good. He ever realizes that he does not do 
vrha t he is commanded, but if ever he would really put him-
self to the task, that is really ever become morally in ear-
nest, then he could keep the law. This is a complete perver-
sion of the message that man is sinner. 
Further, it is t his very moral effort in 
itself, or rather the assumption vrhich is 
bound up with it, that the Good can be attained 
along this path, which is evil. For this is 
the evidence of self-confidence, self-security, 
self-reference, belief in the power to redress 
the situation for and by oneself. Therefore 
evil does not come out most clearly, in its 
most obvious form, where natural morality looks 
for it, namely, in vice, in moral reprobation 
1>1hich everyone can recognize as such, but it 
appears in the self-righteousness of the legal-
ist2 \vhether the latter be a Pharisee, vrho re-
gards himself as justified in the sight of God, 
or a Stoic, who suns himself in his own Divine 
26. Emil Brunner The Divine Imperative, trans. by 
Olive Wyon (PhilaJelphia, The Westminster Press, 
1947), p. 18. 
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goodness, or the mystical saint, vrho thinks 
that he ha s traversed all the stages of sancti-
fication to the end. These all walk in the 
\vay of the just, thinking that this path \vill 
lead them to the goal. They are all living un-
der the illusion that the Good is that which 
they are able to realize~ None of them know 
that God alone is good.2t 
F. THE NATURE OF GOD 
From the necessity of revelation considered from the 
viewpoint of man, the thought of revelation can be considered 
from the viewpoint of God. The necessity of revelation can 
be found in the very nature of God. Again, this will cast 
new light on the nature of revelation for revelation to be 
revelation must have two poles. If revelation \vere not ade-
qua tely adapted to man, then it 1>1ould not be revelation at 
all. If it were not adequately adapted to the nature of God, 
it would not be revelation at all. For revelation must both 
reveal and be received to be true revelation. Without re-
ception nothing is revealed, without content, nothing could 
be revealed. 
God, by His very nature, is not the God of the concept 
of philosophical thought. A-- nan-thought God is not that God 
which has revealed himself to men in history. 
Whatever the content of the philosophical 
ideas of God may be in detail one trait of char-
acter is common to all: it is a man-thought God, 
a God \vho is found by way of thinking, or nega-
tively it is not a God who reveals himself in 
27. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 70. 
history ••• Even if we knew nothing else of 
the philosophical idea of God than this one 
thing, that it is reached or acquired by 
philosophical thinking, we would know by 
that the most essential thing, namely th~~ 
this God is not a God of revelation ••• -
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This has brought us once again to the traditional proofs 
given for God. It has already been demonstrated that Brun- · 
ner feels that the very· attempt to find a logical necessity 
for God is in itself an arrogant attempt of the autonomous 
man. While Faith, which has contact with the God who is ever 
revealing Himself, has no interest in the traditional proofs, 
nevertheless they do demonstrate that reason leads to'\vard God • 
• • • No "proof of the existence of God" leads 
to the Lord God; by this I do not mean that 
such 'tproofs 11 have no value 1 but that they do 
not lead to the knowledge or the Living God.29 
The God of logical necessity cannot be a Personal God. It 
is the very nature of personality that it cannot be known 
through reason. One knows personality only as it reveals 
itself. Though this is relatively true concerning human 
personality, God is the Absolute Personality making this an 
Absolute truth. As logical necessity, God is robbed of Per-
sonality and the Absolute Freedom "~:lhich the God 'l.vho reveals 
Himself has demonstrated. 
Here a remark on "person 11 may be useful. 
What is personality as distinguished from any-
thing else? A person is a being of such a 
28. Emil Brunner, The Scandal of Christianity (Phila-
delphia, The Westminster Press, 1951), p. 33. 
29. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 45. 
kind that we cannot ourselves think it, but 
it reveals itself to us in an act of revela-
tion. What I myself think . is the object of 
my thought. Even 1.,rhen I think God as per-
sonal being this God is the object of my 
thought and therefore not truly personal. 
He can be something different from an ob-
ject of thought only if it is not myself who 
think him, but. himself who reveals himself 
by an act of self-disclosure. Everything 
ivhich I think myself, or the reality which 
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is disclosed by my own mental activity, is 
therefore not a person. A person is that 
unique being which discloses itself and there-
fore enters into my thought-world, so to say, 
as a stranger, affirming itself as an I in its 
own right. In my own thought-world I am the 
unchallenged centre, I am the subject of all 
objects of my thought, and by that, so to say 
master of them all. When, however, a person 
encounters me, a rival world-centre faces met 
a kind of being which refuses to be a part or 
my thought system. This is the absolutely 
unique fact of meeting a Thou. God as per-
sonal God is the God who does not allow him-
self to be placed amongst the objects of my 
thought, but claims not only to be a self~ like 
myself, but the real centre of all I's and I-
worlds. And this is exactly what is meant by 
the Lord God revealing himself as Lord. Per-
haps this becomes clearer when we come to con-
sider the second fundamental trait of the re-
vealed essence of God, namely divine love and 
mercy.30 
To return for a moment to general revelation, it can be 
clearly seen that the vital reason that man cannot know God 
in this maru1er, is because in general revelation, God can-
not be known as Person. Only as God speaks to us, in the 
Special Revelation of His Person, can man really kno1.v Him. 
Where can one then expect to encounter this Special Revela-
tion of His Person? One would naturally turn to the Bible 
30. Brunner, The Scandal of Christianit~, p. 41. 
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as the greatest single vritness to revelation, and examine 
its contents to learn of the nature of revelation. 
Brunner has often referred to the Bible as the Word of 
God. It is t his, only by virtue of the fact, and only in 
so · far as it bears \vitness to Christ. To call the Bible 
the ~vord of God does not in anyway imply that it is infal-
libly inspired. 
First of all comes the tradition of his-
torical facts 1 as they appear in the Gospels, in the book or Acts, and, to some extent, also 
in the Epistles. This early tradition was 
guided and inspired by the Holy Spirit, but 
was also a product of human research and se-
lection and, therefore, it is not verbally 
inspired. Even this simple tradition of facts 
is intended to be a \vi tness of faith, a testi-
mony to Christ; it is the tradition of the 
kerygma. No one today \vho keeps his eyes open 
to facts fails to be aware that this tradition 
has certain errors and inconsistencies. At 
the present time only an ignorant or insin-
cere person can produce a complete "Harmony of 
the Gospels," or an account vlhi ch reconciles 
all contradictions in the reports of the Lucan 
and the Pauline explanations and discussions. 
The Apostles who, in the "Council;·· of the .A-
postles," first strove -vrith one another before 
they could come to a common decision, are also 
in their accounts of e31nts not free from in-
consistency and error. 
G. THE BIBLE 
It might be inserted here that the Church also can de-
liver the \vord of God. Its relationship, however, must be 
the same as that of the Bible to Christ. Exposition of the 
31. Bru~ner, Revelation and Reason, p. 128. 
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Bible is not a necessity, but the Word of the Church must be 
in harmony with the Person of Christ. 
The \ford is preached not only where the 
discourse is explicitly expository in charac-
ter, but it is preached wherever Jesus Christ 
is proclaimed in harmony with the witness of 
the Bible. God is not a "Book God;" what mat-
ters is not the Book, but the Person. The 
statement "We have not Christ apart from the 
Bible," is true for the Church as a whole; it 
is only indirectly true for the individual who 
passes on his faith to another or \vho receives 
faith from another ••• The decisive elemen.~,the 
process of creation may happen without the o-
pening of a Bible ai all, without the quotation 
of a text from the Bible. But it cannot take 
place apart from· the fact that the one 1.-1ho 
gives his testimony lives in the Bible, and in 
a Christian community, which is spiritually 
nourished by t~2 whole expository tradition 
of the Church. 
Returning to the thought of the witness found to Christ 
in the Bible, one can find this witness in several forms. 
The primary witness is that given by the disciples as the 
Word of God broke through to them. Their first witness was 
a response to this revelation, '~hou art the Christ, the Son 
of the Living God. 11 33 This is the vrord of personal encounter. 
From this \vord of personal encounter, the word of witness 1.,ras 
changed to teaching, the telling about Jesus. Although this 
was a direct result of the first experience, it is only a 
secondary witness to Christ. 
The Old Testament has found its way into the canon be-
cause it also bears witness to Christ. This does not mean 
that it has the same viewpoint as the New Testament. In 
32. Bru~ner, Revelation and Reason, p. 141. 
33. Matthew 16:16. 
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fact, it has an altogether different viewpoint, for the Old 
Testament looks foward to the coming of Christ, while the 
New Testament looks back as the mission accomplished. Christ 
is the unity of all revelation, whether Biblical or that gi-
ven to the church at a later date. 
The unity found throughout the Bible does not mean the 
unity of doctrine. It is not a unity of doctrine, but a 
unity of the divine revealing action. In order to maintain 
unity of doctrine, one is continually caused painful embar-
rassment because of the differences in the historical situ-
ation. The doctrine is not the same because of the limita-
tions of the human recipient of revelation, for one act of 
revelation builds upon another, and without the first the 
second would not be understood • 
• • • When, however men try to read the same 
truths into the Old Testament as are in the 
New, they are not using Scriptural exegesis, 
but allegory. On the other hand, expositors 
who fail to see the Old Testament reveals and 
bears witness to the same Goq who speaks to 
us in the New Testament are not expounding 
the Scriptur~~ in harmony with their central 
message. • • 
The basic reason that the attempt to make the Bible a 
unity of doctrine was in error was that it destroyed this 
one central purpose of the Bible. The purpose, according 
to Brtutner, is to reveal Christ. It is the revelation of 
His person. As one changes the Bible into unity of doctrine, 
34. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 197. 
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the focus faith is turned away from God to absolute truths. 
The idea of personal encounter which takes place by faith 
will be lost. Doctrine only serves its purpose by examin-
ing the message of the Church to see if it fosters this per-
sonal encounter. But t his doctrine, is in itself, not an 
attempt to arrive at final truth through reason • 
• • • In order to achieve as correct a doctrine 
as possible, we must take pains to express it 
ever more truly and clearly, and yet we must 
not imagine that we have really said 11it 11 when 
we have dissected and refined our definitions 
a hundred times over. Were Christ not the Word 
made flesh, the content of the definite doctri-
nal statements of Apostles or Prophets~ all 
this effort would be in vain; but because He 
Himself is the \fjord, and therefore can never 
be fully expressed in human words, no doctrinal 
formation, however excellent, can claim to be 
the Word of God itself, or even the infallibly 
"correct" doctrine, v.Ihich has been formulated 
and laid down once for all.35 
Apostolic doctrine about Christ cannot be harmonized. Often 
contradictory, from this viewpoint and that, the Apostles 
sought in vain to express the Person of Christ. But He is 
beyond human words and human powers of comprehension. 
That which makes it so important that the Bible be 
judged in the light of the person of Christ is that He is 
the revelation. For this reason revelation must be personal 
encounter. The words of prophets in the Old Testament bore 
authority because they had received them from God. But the 
identity of the prophets was of little importance. Their 
35. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 153. 
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authority was given them in the message of God. In Christ 
the message and the authority have been brought down to one. 
He is the message to the world, the supreme revelation, as 
no one else could ever be. 
Concerning revelation and Biblical criticism, Brunner 
is more in difficulty than is Barth. The message of reve-
lation is a little more closely connected with this \·Torld. 
To Barth, Biblical criticism simply does not matter. At 
this point Brunner charged Barth with Docetism. In so far 
as the Bible vli tnessed to us concerning Christ, Brunner be-
lieved one must accept it. It is the message of faith, not 
that of reason. In so far as the Bible witnessed to natural 
events, to things of this world, Brurmer did not object to 
the scrutiny of higher criticism. In fact, he welcomed it 
for the part it played in the destruction of Bibliolatry • 
• • • He binds us to the Scripture, in so far 
as it witnesses to Christ, in so far as it 
discloses the will of God and His nature, 
but not in so far as it teaches us ordinary 
facts about the world. The letter of the Bible · 
is not the object of faith, but the means of 
the divine self-revelation. • .we are not 
told to "believe in the Scriptures," but in 
faith in Christ to know and to experi~gce the 
word of Scripture as the word of God.j 
Whether Brunner has escaped from the dile~~a which has so 
plagued the so-called Orthodox groups is doubtful. He must 
constantly be defining that which is of Christ and that lvhich 
36. BruP~er, Revelation and Reason, p. 181. 
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is of · the world, and is constantly in danger of completely 
denying the vlOrld and falling into mysticism. Already, he 
admitted that some criticism has gone too far, that it must 
be tempered. But in the long run, Biblical criticism, he 
feels, did Christianity a favor. By destroying a false faith 
in the Bible, men are now able by the aid of the witness of 
the Holy Spirit to leap over the barriers of historical 
relativism and become contemporary with Christ, in a sense 
not even Pontius Pilate could ever become a contemporary. 
H. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF TRUE FAITH 
Even though faith is a personal encounter vJith Christ, 
though revelation comes from a sphere outside the legitimate 
bounds of reason, yet the message of revelation is adapted 
to man and pas ses through a process of rational understand-
ing by the recipient • 
• • • Revelation is always a mystery but it is 
never magic. In revelation the unconditioned 
and the conditioned subjects, the Absolute, 
the Infinite, and the c~eaturely spirit meet. 
Therefore, revelation always passes through 
a process of understanding by man. Even if 
revelation creates a new understanding, it 
does not create this without laying3 ~laim upon the natural understanding ••• ·; 
True faith is never a neutral act such as the assent 
given to -vrhat the Church has set up as infallible dogma. 
True faith is the giving of oneself completely into the 
37. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 15. 
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control and power of the Saviour. This is not done blindly, 
but it is done because man has become convinced that this 
is what is best for him. These convincements are in the 
sphere of the rational, in the sphere of the comprehension 
of the natural understanding, \vhich tell him the need of a 
complete surrender. 
To use an illustration from ordinary hu-
man life, "faith" in the genuine, Biblical, 
sense is not the acceptance of the statement 
of a reliable authority, but it is the rela-
tion of trust in another person; it is personal 
relation between two human beings. It is true, 
of course that the personal act of trust, obe-
dience, and love is preceded by some elements 
of objective knowledge--as also they precede 
the act of faith--but they are not the per-
sonal act itself ••• When I give myself to God 
in the obedience of faith, I become free from 
the anxious .-intensity- of '-:self-absdrption, and 
I love my neighbor as myself. For when I give 
myself to God, I w~gl what He will, I love 
with His love ••• 
The knowledge which has come by faith does not destroy 
reason. It merely sets it aright. That which is destroyed, 
is the arrogance and the pride which has tended to make the 
reason to become its own God • 
• • • The Word of God, which in its decisive 
content, as the word of the Cross, is folly 
and scandal to my natural reason, is th8 di-
vine hammer which knocks on the closed door 
of the autonomous self-imprisoned reason. 
But it does not destroy reason; rather, it 
liberates it, by setting it free from the 
curse of sin, namely, from that illusion of 
autonomy, the desire to being like God, and 
it reverses the Fall, which consisted in 
the fact that man wanted to eat of the fruit 
· 38. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 39. 
of the tree in the center of t he garden, a s 
well as t he fruit of the other trees~ in or-
der that he might be equal with God • .)9 . 
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This leaves to reason the field of its legitimate con-
cern, the world. In this field the reason ought to dominate, 
for man must progress. Thus, true faith is not opposed to 
Science as long as Science does not go beyond the sphere of 
her legitimate area • 
• • • on the other hand, there is nothing 
wrong in the i n sistence on autonomy in the 
sphere of knowledge; indeed, this should be 
recognized as the proper goal of kno~o..rledge. 
In everything which concerns this world, it 
is part of our destiny_and our duty to seek, 
as far as possible, to reach our "mvn" know-
ledge by the use of our reason. • .The auto-
nomy of the knm>~ledge of this world is envel-
oped in . the theonomy of the knovlledge of God. 
We cannot, and ought not, to try to know God 
in the same way that we know the world. We 
are intended to kno-v1 Him and can knmv Him 
only througU His own v'iord, from His ovm self-
revelation. 0 
I. THE DEFENSE OF FAITH 
The world continually has called upon the Church to 
prove that the truth vlhich She has, has been Divinely re-
vealed. By this challenge, the world has been able clever-
ly to entangle the Church in a question, the very presuppo-
sition of which eliminated the possibility of its being an-
swered. To prove this truth is, of necessity, to give the 
39. Ibid., p. 179. 
40. Ibid., p. 177. 
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rational grounds for it. This is beyond the sphere of rea-
son. 
• • • ~vere faith to try to deal with the un-
reasonable demands implied in that question, 
by which it is confronted, it would no longer 
be faith at all. Revelation, as the Christ-
ian faith understands it, is indeed , by its 
very nature, something that lies beyond all 
rational arguments; the argument which it cer-
tainly claims in its support does not lie in 
the sphere of rational knowledge, but in the 
sphere of that divine truth which can be at-
tained only through divine self-communication, 
and not through human research of any kind. 
That question or assumption therefore proceeds 
from an ~ priori rejection of revelation, from 
the denial of the possibility of a knowledge 
that transcends rational knowledge. Henar it 
is the question of doubt or of unbelief. 
The Church, instead of permitting the world to scorn 
because She refuses to answer this question, must in her 
turn gain the offensive. She must not only demonstrate to 
the world the illegitimacy of this question, but also take 
the offensive by revealing the insufficiency of reason to 
subjugate all things , even God Himself, to itself. 
While the autonomous reason maintains 
that it must be possible to incorporate all 
that is true into the sphere of the criteria 
which it has itself set up--reason that is 
transcendent is said to be untrue--faith re-
verses the lvhole problem, and shows that it 
,::· is .: pre~isely this demand that falsifies knmv-
ledge and the concept of truth. It is not 
that God and His truth must have room within 
the sphere of reason, but reason and its truth 
must find its place in God. For it is not man 
who i ·s the measure of all things but God. 
Within the truth of revelation ail tha t reason 
kno-vrs and recognizes falls into place. Faith 
--------------------
41. Ibid., p. 205. 
does not come into conflict with reason it-
self, but with the imperialism of the human 
reason; we must, hO\vever, add that this "im-
perialism11 or this "illusion of autonomy" is 
not a matter that affect certain people only, 
but it is common to all the sons of men.~2 
J. THE RECEPTION OF REVELATION 
66 
Throughout his writings, particularly in his book which 
dealt specifically with the problem, Revelation and Reason, 
Brunner has attempted to lay aside the stigma of irrational-
ism by which he has been kno-vm. His defensive effort has 
been turned into an offense by his charge that basical ly the 
ones who oppose him are the ones v!ho are the irrationalists. 
Man yields to faith because he has been convinced rationally 
that it is in his ovm best interest. Faith does not destroy 
reason, it strengthens it. It shatters the self-centeredness 
of reason and imparts to it the quality of objectivity. 
Brunner, however, believes that reason does have a posi-
tive relationship to faith. This relationship is in the 
process of cloaking of revelation which God does to permit 
man to receive it. It is the garb of flesh which enables 
the spiritual to be seen and understood by the one to whom 
the message is intended. 
To the Greek, He comes as one who speaks 
Greek, to the Chinese as one who speaks Chi-
nese in order that man may be able to under-
stand Him, just as a tall man will bend dovm 
42. Ibid., p. 213. 
to a little child and take him · on his knee 
in order that he may be able to look into 
his face. God does not talk over the heads 
of His human children, and He do es not pour 
His Spirit into their hearts by force; but 
He speaks to them in a way that they can un-
derstand. The understanding of the Word--in 
so far as it is the grammatical and logical 
understanding of something that has been said; 
also in so far as it is the grammatical and 
logical understanding of the preaching of 
the Gospel--is an act of mental and rational 
self-activity on the part of man. Without 
this rational self-activity on the part of 
man no faith arises. We do not say that faith 
is this rational self-activity of man but 
that it is the logical grammatical understand-
ing of that which is said, even if said by an 
Apostle or a Prophet; without this mental, ra-
tional self-activity the Word of God cannot be 
understood; without it no faith arises. R~~­
son is the conditio sine ~ua llQll of faith. j 
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One can still understand this part of the revelation of 
God and yet not have faith. The message of Jesus or the A-
postles can be understood perfectly by all rational men, a~d 
yet there may be a failure of all of them to obtain faith. 
On the other hand the same message may be apprehended by the 
most rabid believer and still no act of faith occur. It is 
only when the message comes home to man, when it speaks to 
him in his sinful condition of his sinful condition, that 
man makes the act of faith. 
In this judgment on man, \-Thich, it is 
true, is not given by faith, but with the aid 
of faith, the naked reality of man's need 
stands out clearly. Hence this judgment in-
cludes all that man already knew about him-
self--that he is in distress; that he is sinful, 
43. Ibid., p. 417. 
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guilty; tha t he is dissatisfied with his ex-
istence. Only now, however, do all t h ese per-
ceptions come wholly to the surface, whereas 
formerly they were forcibly suppressed. Now 
alone , do they come out into the open, just 
as they are without any illusions, no longer 
repressed by the censor of the self which loves 
itself and is a~~ious about itself , but in the 
stern severity of the truth, -vrhich sees things 
as they are in the merciless light of the law. 
Here all "immanent" self-knowledge c omes into 
its ovm, only without all the modifications 
connected with the insistence on the autonomy 
of the reason. Thus faith does not reject 
the rational judgment of man on himself, but 
it mer ely impels man to express fully what 
previously he had only half admitted. Faith 
forces the rea son to complete honesty. For 
it is only in t his honesty, which unveils man's 
real situation as a whole, that faith--or, 
rather, Christ--can speak His own word, which 
was not within man's power at all. Here, then, 
something quite new emerges, a paradoxical 
self-knowledge, namely, identifie~tion with 
Christ: Christ my Righteousness. 
It might be concluded then, that faith in its true na-
ture, bec omes evident in the light of the fall of man. Faith 
does not shatter the reason, it sets it once more aright. No 
longer does reason suppress what it knows to be true , that 
man is sinner, but it accepts through the enabling power which 
comes by faith the truth of reason's ovm self-centeredness and 
insufficiency. Faith has done its work. The Divine Person 
has revealed Himself. That flash of recognition having gone, 
reason once again resumes its arrogant ways until once again 
it is struck dovln by the r evelation of the Divine Holiness. 
44. Ibid., p. 426. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONSERVATIVE POSITION OF E.J. CARNELL 
A. BIOGRAPHY 
Edward John Carnell is one of the bright lights of A-
merican Conservatism. Relatively only a young man, the fu-
ture gives hope for his becoming one of the great apologists 
of this age. In addition to the publishing of three books 
concerning Christian philosophy, Carnell not only has won 
the William Brenton Greene Jr. prize in Apologetics at West-
minister Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, but also first 
prize in Eerdmans Evangelical Book Award Competition in 
1948.1 
Carnell received his college training at Whe aton Col-
lege. After attending Westminister Theological Seminary, 
he also attended Boston University , from which he received 
the degree of Ph.D. and Harvard Divinity School from which 
he received the Th.D. degree. He has taught at Gordon Col-
lege of Theology and Missions in Boston and Gordon Divinity 
School , Brookline, Massachusetts. At present, he is in-
structor at Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, Cali-
f . 2 orn~a. 
1. From the Book Cover of An Introduction to Christian 
Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1948). 
2. Ibid. 
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While attending Boston University, Carnell was greatly 
influenced by the teachings of Professor E.S. Brightman, 
from whom he has borrowed much in his epistemological study. 
Under no circumstance, however, can this be taken as an im-
plication that Carnell has necessarily reached the same con-
elusions as did Dr. Brightman. This could only be deter-
mined by a thorough study of both men which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
B. THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 
Carnell has started where man is. In the gradual en-
folding of day to day occurrence·s, the greatest problem which 
faces every individual is the problem of happiness. It is 
evident that by happiness he does not mean it in the hedonis-
tic sense of the term. This is a happiness which involves 
final ends, not the immediate satisfaction of our desires 
and wants. Bound to the earth by his physical being, man 
has been subjected to pain, disfigurement, disease, and worst 
of all, death. But freed from this environment, man's soul 
can soar above the grimeand the mire of mere physical exist-
ence and envision ideal existence. In this existence, the 
problems of his ovm physical existence disappear into what 
man believes to be the ideal existence. What he envisions 
and the method by which these ideals are to be gained are 
simply known as values. 
That which men choose seeking an increase 
of happiness is known as a value. Nothing 
mystical about, it , a value issimply anything 
which we prize or esteem. Values comprise the 
very stuff of satisfaction, the magnetic power 
which draws a free man into commitment.j 
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In this quest for happiness as found and made objective 
in the choice of values, man's greatest issue which must be 
settled is that of certainty. The possibility of values 
vThich might be chosen are infinite in number, but man's time 
here on earth is limited. At best, one can only scan a few 
of the multitude of possibilities. How then can he hope to 
know with certainty that he has the truth? 
Carnell, to aid in the search for values, has attempted 
to set up what he believes to be a working criteria. With-
out some sort of criteria man would be· floundering about with-
out direction or goal. Whether man does so knowingly or not, 
he must have purpose, whether it be immediate satisfaction 
or long range and ultimate happiness. In some way, man must 
attempt to link his ideal world with the world which he ex-
periences in the cold and hard facts of physical existence. 
If the practical problem of man is dispel-
ling the fear of death through a successful union 
of the ideal and empirical worlds, the theoret-
ical problem is the location of a rational con-
nection between these realms. Philosophically 
this difficulty is known as the problem of the 
one within the many. The many are the particu-
lars of the time-space universe while the one 
is the logical or teleological connection between 
3. Edward John Carnell, A Philosophy of ~ Christian 
Religion (Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1952), p. 16. 
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them.4 
The problem of the one and the many has always been one 
of the vital points of philosophy. Empirically, man has 
gathered the facts of reality, rationally he has attempted 
to place them into a logical system. On the one hand, if 
man has ignored the reason in his philosophy, it will be 
slanted toward the many. Consequently, everything in reali-
ty \vill be observed in the state of change. Empiricall y , 
man has always been impressed by the vicissitude of nature. 
But, on the other hand, if man withdraws from emp~rical ob-
. 
servation so far as to place nearly all the emphasis upon 
the rational, he forgets the cosmos of movement. From the 
many, he sees the one. Becoming is forgotten -. i.I'l the light 
of rational being. Only the eternal, changeless realm is 
the real. 
We are still tempted to make an either/or 
affair of what must be a both/and. We cannot 
choose between logic and experience. Without 
logic our experience cannot be normative; with-
out experience our logic cannot be relevant to 
the human situation. This problem, like the · 
poor, is always with us.5 
The Christian view of reality, then, must include both points 
of view, ignoring neither the rational nor the empirical. To 
form this unity, Carnell has stated his criteria for truth as 
systematic consistency. If a truth is stated and proven 
without doubt, then it necessarily implies the falsity of its 
4. Ed-vrard John Car.nell 2 An Introduction to Christian Apologet~cs (Grand Rapias~m. B. ~erdmans-Publishing 
Company, f948), p. 29. 
5. Ibid., p. 39. 
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contradiction. Hence, any system of philosophy must first 
of all be proven to be consistent. But sheer consistency is 
not sufficient, for if the philosophy does not pertain to 
the actual world in which man has found himself , then his 
philosophy is of no value to him. So man must also be able 
to observe the facts of sensory data which have come to him 
in the totality of his experience. The mistake of the ra-
tionalist has been the attempt which he has made to find a 
rational relationship between the many parts of the empiri-
cally observed flux • 
• • • Truth is a systematic account of reality. 
We do not wait until we can see rat ional con-
nections in reality before we affirm such re-
ality. The reason for this is two-fold. First, 
if we waited until we saw the rational con-
nection between things, we would not know any-
thing in nature. There is no demonstrable rea-
son why one atom of oxygen and two atoms of 
hydrogen should logically form that colorless 
fluid called water. Science describes nature 
by showing us that this combination al111ays 
produces water, but there is no law of logic 
which says that it must. Second, and here we 
presuppose the Christian major premise, the 
discrete facts of the empirical universe are 
related to each other, not by demonstrable 
necessity, but the teleology. The world is 
knit together according to >a plan which existed 
in the mind of the Creator. The relation , 
therefore, be t ween the number of goats in Al-
bania to the weight of the nearest star , or 
the relation between the depth of the Atlantic 
Ocean in its center to the death of Christ on 
the cross, is teleological. God freely elected 
to create the wor ld. There was no antecedent 
compulsion, either from within or without, 
which determined that God should make this 
world, rather than another. God freely elected 
to display His glory in this world, and the 
motive behind the choice \vas that it pleased 
God, this and none other. The present "TOrld is 
a consistent world and it is the best world, 
because God mgde it; for God is consistency 
and goodness. 
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Negatively, Carnell has attempted to prove that syste-
matic consistency is the correct criterion for truth by ex-
posing as inadequate other criteria which have been presented. 
How well he actually has disproved each of the criteria is 
a matter of conjecture, no doubt depending upon the reader's 
personal attitude. An illustration of one of the refutations 
is sufficient to demonstrate how Carnell has handled each of 
the tests for truth. 
Custom is any habit or practice which has . 
come to be associated with the uniform actions 
of a given individual or group by reason of its 
long continuance or uniformity, as saluting the 
flag, or following certain rules of etiquette 
while in Rome. But customs can be good or bad, 
true or false. Something beyond and outside of 
custom, therefore, must test the validity of 
customs themselves.? 
Let the reader suppose that he has just presented to one who 
thoroughly believes in custom the argument just presented. 
Throughout his lifetime, his ideals and purposes of life 
have been centered around tradition and custom. Further-
more, he has agreed to your definition of custom. But he 
does not, nor will he ever agree with you that some customs 
are good or bad, true or false. It is intrinsically the 
very basis of his belief that all customs are good and that 
none are false. One cannot prove the truth or falsity of 
6. Ibid., p. 61. 
7. Ibid., p. 48. 
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this claim unless there is brought to this assumption some 
other criterion of truth upon which both can agree. The 
case of the above argument \vould simply end upon the 11 i t is" 
and 11 it isn ' t" sour note. The assumption which Carnell has 
brought to all the tests of truth, and which he has used t o 
defeat the~,is the very assumption which he has sought to 
prove as the only valid test for truth. This is indeed a 
faux pas, for he assumed to be true that which he hopes to 
prove true. He has no l ogical grounds for this assumption, 
though he probably has shown its superiority. 
The law of contradiction is so basic to 
meaningful thought and , consequently, to truth , 
for truth is concerned only with meaning, that 
it cannot be demonstrated. The only proof for 
the law is that nothing is meaningful8without the law ' s validity being presupposed. 
Behind the assumption of the law of contradiction is 
still another assumption. For who can be certain that to-
morrow this same assumption will work. Truth, in its very 
nature, assumes that once applied, that every following op-
portunity will give you exactly the same results without 
fear of contradiction. What assures men of this regularity 
of the truth? The Christian assumption is that God is the 
guarantor of truth. Hence, to thiru{ truthfully, is simply 
to think God's own thoughts after Him. 
We say that the more perfect a mind is , 
the more perfect is the meaning that that 
mind has in any act of judgment. The mother 
8. Ibid. , p. 57. 
is more perfect than the child, and the ex-
pert is more perfect than the mother (unless 
the mother is an expert, too). When we carry 
this through what mind is the most perfect 
receptacle of all meaning? There is no al-
ternative. It is God's mind, for such a mind 
is His than which no greater may be conceived. 
He, then, is truth, for, being perfect, He 
cannot err. The meaning He gives to things 
is absolute, for He is the Author of things. 
Truth, therefore, is correspondence with the 
mind of God. The test for truth is systematic 
consistency, for God is consistent and the 
world that He teleologically orders gives 
system to this consistency. As we united 
validity with experience, we have a perfect 
test for truth.9 
C. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF FAITH 
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So far, Carnell has been primarily conqerned with some 
of the difficulties connected with the reason as it is re-
lated to sensory experience. Is this test for truth valid 
when it comes to matters of faith? Defining faith as "com-
mitment or trust ulO Carnell would not hesitate in answer-
' 
ing this question in the affirmative. One does not commit 
himself to anything for which he has no apprehension. To 
have knowledge means that man must have truth. To have the 
truth implies that the test for truth must then be applied. 
Second, and perhaps more to the point, a 
straw-man opponent is attacked when faith and 
knowledge· are antipathetically related. The 
Bible is a system of propositions which address 
the reason as decisively as any other faculty 
in man. Kn9wledge is the light which clarifies 
9. Ibid., p. 62. 
10. Carnell, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, 
p. 29. 
the nature of things to which man ought to 
be committed. Reason tests, segregates, 
orders, and classifies. Proper commitment 
does not follovl through until the whole man 
is convinced of the reasonableness and co-
herence of a value proposition. I(nowledge 
describes .and orders the alternatives, sep-
arating the worthy from the unworthy, the 
good from the bad, the true from the false, 
so that the hei1t may have an unambiguous 
place to rest. 
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Faith then is limited by knowledge. One cannot trust in or 
believe in the unknown. But faith means more than rational 
knowledge. It is commitment, a commitment that man himself 
is not willing to make, indeed cannot ever make in his o~m 
power. Special illumination is given by God Himself in the 
witnessing He does directly to the heart of man and through 
the truth of general revelation. The former is special 
grace, the latter is common grace. Because of the latter 
grace, all men everywhere should be convinced of the truth 
of their own sinfulness, repent and turn to God • 
• • • Faith is but a whole-soul trust in God's 
word as true ••• The power by which the heart 
is enabled to see that the word of God is true 
is the Holy Spirit. The word of God is thus 
self-authenticating. It bears its own testi-
mony to truth; it seals its own validity. If 
the word required something more certain than 
itself to give it validity, it would no longer 
be God's word. If God, by definition, is that 
than which no truer may be conceived, then His 
word is that than which no truer may be con-
ceived. It would be a derogation to the ef-
ficiency of revelation to suppose that _any 
more than God's Spirit is needed to seal the 
the word to the hearts of believers ••• 12 
11. Ibid. 
12. Carnell, Apologetics, p. 66. 
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Because God's word, that is the Bible or Holy Scriptures, 
does not need any authentication than itself, will it there-
fore mean that the law o·f systematic consistency will not 
apply? This is not a contradiction, which might be supposed, 
with the former statement that all knowledge must be system-
atically consistent. Rather, it is in the greatest of all 
harmonies with it. For who could be more in accord \vith the 
la\·1 of contradiction than its Author? Apprehending of truth 
means an imvard apprehending whether this be of faith or of 
the world. In matters of faith, however, special grace is 
given to gain certitude that our hearts might be assured of 
its truth. But the test of truth must still be applied to 
see that faith itself is consistent with general revelation. 
Carnell has warned his readers that one dare not rest 
in reason alone. If he were to do this, then he is likely 
to fall into the error of a cold fundamentalism. Dead ortho-
doxy is a contradiction in itself. To reach any kind of or-
thodox position, it is necessary to rely upon special_ reve-
lation. But special revelation most certainly is not satis-
fied with mere rational assent. The Bible teaches that man's 
basic need is fellowship. 
• • .Knowledge by inference is a handmaid to 
knowledge by acquaintance. Man must employ 
his mind with astuteness; he ~use the laws 
of logic to guide him into paths that are ra-
tionally coherent, for contradictions he can-
not assent to. We should only commit ourselves 
to that which is rationally consistent. Fool-
ishness we must not believe. But the highest 
knowledge terminates in fellowship. Less than 
this draws out less than the whole mano The 
Bible defends the primacy of reason as the 
faculty through which all options must clear. 
But it likewise teaches that formal ration-
ality performs its job only when it remains 
a humble voice in the vrilderness, preparing 
the way for fellowship.l3 
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Fellowship has been presented by Carnell as the most 
rational of acts. It is the purpose of every rational evi-
dence which concernsitself about God. When man has examined 
that in which he is about to place his trust, and finding 
the individual worthy of trust and commitment, even to one's 
own benefit, the culmination of these rational acts could 
only be fellowship. Under such circumstances, to refuse 
fellowship would be the irrational act. 
When addressing the heart therefore, the 
Scriptures use rationally intelligible proposi-
tions. Spirit can be led to the God worthy of 
being worshiped only through the avenue of ob-
jectively veracious evidences. If our know-
ledge of God were discontinuous with good sci-
entific-philosophic inquiry1 we would never know God at all. Faith in God is not generi-
cally different from faith in either another 
individual or in the body of scientifically 
veracious knovlledge. Generic faith is a rest-
ing of the mind in the sufficiency of the evi-
dences. Saving faith may go beyond this 
general expression, but it does not exclude it. 
~fuoever does not first have g~neric faith can 
hardly be said to possess the richer form. E-
ven the highest surgings of spiritual ecstasy 
own no powers which are free from the veto of 
the understanding. "I will pray 1r.1i th the spirit 
and I will pray with the mind also; I will sing 
with the spirit and I will sing with the mind 
also." (I Corinthians 14:15) If Biblical 
Christianity rested on rational paradox or ab- 14 surdity, it 'I.<TOuld quickly reduce to foolishness. 
13. Carnell, Christian Philosophy, p. 183. 
14. Ibid., p. 450. 
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Carnell has described this act of fellowship as the 
third locus of truth. In philosophy, one is limited to only 
two loci. The first locus is "the sum total of reality it-
self."l5 The second locus is the proposition which the phi-
losopher made when experience has been examined in the cru-
cible of the reason and found to be systematically consist-
ent with the total of reality. But the third locus of truth 
which Christianity brings to the forefront, is the truth 
found in the heart. This is fellmvship. Thus it is not 
sufficient for man to be satisfied simply to know that there 
is truth around him. He must grasp that truth by making and 
proving rational propositions concerning that truth and thus 
to have the truth itself. But this is still not enough to 
satisfy the desperate need of man's existence. He must con-
form to real existence. He must be truth. This conformation 
- was most highly exemplified in Christ, but in a lesser degree 
must every true Christian also conform. 
The Christian philosophy of truth may be 
summarized as follows: (a) Reality "out there 11 
is the truth. This universe is trul~ God's 
creation. (b) Truth is a property of a judg-
ment or proposition which corresponds to re-
ality. The mind of God forms a perfect system 
of truth. "Thy word is truth." (John 17:17) 
Finite minds approach this perfection only by 
degrees, by systems of thought, in short. 
Since their systems are never complete, how-
ever, propositional truth can never pass be-
yond probability. (c) Truth in the heart is 
a quality of personal character which coincides 
with the law of love. Love is the stuff which 
15. Ibid. 
forms the character of God. Men become
6
the 
truth as their character becomes good.l 
D. THE THOMISTS REFUTED 
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One of the serious difficulties which faced Carnell was 
how sensory data became meaningful. How was it possible for 
man to make predications concerning that which he has ob-
served, expecting them to be normative for future experi-
ence? If man were not able to do this, science, faith, and 
reason would not be possible. 
Carnell has emphatically rejected the purely empirical 
approach of the Thomists. That which has eliminated the fa-
mous proofs of God from rational thinking, is the Thomistic 
insistence that nothing exists in the mind other than which 
has come through the senses. Since space is limited so that 
Carnell's full discussion of the proofs is impossible, the 
following two arguments seem sufficient to give the crux of 
the whole matter. 
1. Em2iricism ends in skepticism. Hume 
took Thomas' dictum, nihil est in intellectu 
nisi prius fuerit in ~~' seriously and 
showed that by it nothing normative can be 
found •. If all the mind has to work with are 
sense-perceptions as reports to the mind of 
what is going on in the external world, know-
ledge can never rise to the universal and the 
necessary, for from flux only flux can come •• 
2. Principle Qt economy eliminates the 
16. Ibid., p. 453. 
17. Carnell, Apologetic~, p. 129. 
17 
• 
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Christian God. Hume has set the pace for all 
empiricists by dictating that the cause be pro-
portionate to the effect, meaning that one 
may inductively introduce no more to explain 
an effect than a cause great enough1~o account for the effect, but no greater ••• 
The Thomistic empiricists have twice violated the rule of 
contradiction. This was more than enough to force their 
system into disfavor. St. Thomas Aquinas was blind to the 
a priori concepts which he had brought into his system. It 
was no accident that such proofs were developed only in a 
Christian world. Since all admit that universals are not 
actually the object of sense data, from when did they come? 
All one can ever hope to do is to give a series :of discon-
nected impressions if he were to rely solely upon empirical 
observation. In the same sense, emptr~cal perceptions can-
not, even at very best, possibly account for a cause which 
is greater than that which is required t o produce a given 
effect. According to sensory data alone, the God who created 
matter must either have exhausted Himself in this creation, 
or one can know very little about Him through sensory per-
ception alone. Under no circumstances, could the God real-
ized through sensory perception be the One of Infinite Power 
vri th \ihom Christians claim to fellowship. 
E. POSITIVISH' S LIHITATIONS 
With this analysis before us, the views of modern pos-
itivism should be examined in the light of what Carnell has 
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to say about them. Carnell is under continual obligation 
by the formula which he himself ha s chosen, continually to 
do battle with all rival systems of thought. Not only must 
he do battle, but he must prove that the systems which he 
opposes are fraught with more and greater difficulties than 
his own, or he himself will be a vic t im of his own criteria. 
Modern Positivism began to be popular during the period 
of the Rennaissance. Casting aside every a priori conce.pt, 
the Rennaissance mind began to study the cosmos \vith great 
intensity. Once the a priori was fully cast aside, the 
scientific method and science herself were in a position to 
dominate the lives and minds of the men of the western world. 
The new method, instead of glancing at a leaf and therefrom 
deducing the entire nature and attributes of God, began to 
examine the cosmos with the expectation of finding results 
which would influence the here and now. This was not man's 
attempt to submit himself to God, but to submit the forces 
of nature unto himself. 
A glance at this chart will show that 
positivism has carried Kant's epistemology 
to its logical conclusion. Only factual pro-
positions -- those which science can process 
in the laboratory by an operational experi-
ment terminate on reality. The rest may in-
volve either a wish or just plain imagination. 
Non-cognitive meanings perhaps have the prag-
matic value of getting people to do things in 
their practical life or of giving them solace 
in poetry and religion, but they have no in-
formational function. They leave the formal 
and quantitative for the biological and quali-
tative. While they sometimes express how we 
feel or how we wish things were, only factually 
meaningful propositions can suggest experimental 
operations. John Dewey describes the steps 
in this epistemology as follows: A felt 
difficulty in our experience; careful clari-
fication of what the difficulty is; careful 
preparation of hypotheses to account for a 
solution; mental elaboration through defi-
nite if/then cause-sequence relations; and 
a final testiny through actual observation 
Qt. experiment. 9 
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From the a priori bondage characterizing Thomistic 
empiricism, positivism has been fettered with the bondage 
of .the a posteriori. ~Vhereas the a priori philosophy scarce-
ly glanced at nature, the new philosophy cannot get its eyes 
away from the cosmos. Unless a statement is subject to the 
direct scrutiny which can take place under the carefully 
controlled conditions of a laboratory, it can be said to 
have no bearing upon reality. Ethics, prayers, metaphysics, 
appeals, or other such statements, though of value in the 
emotive sense, bear no relationship to reality. 
And so the swing of the pendulum has been 
completed. In classical philosophy the only 
sentence worth-while ~ the normative, while 
in modern scientific empiricism the normative 
is altogether disclaimed. Men once believed 
they could reach reality through data intuited 
by the inner light; positivism knows only the 
light of science. It was previously supposed 
that propositions were objectively true whether 
or not they could ever be carried out into con-
crete experience; positivism now scorns the 
notion as prescientific. No statement is fa25 
tual which cannot terminate on an operation. 
Carnell does not fail to demonstrate that the basis of 
19. Carnell, Philosophy, p. 139. 
20. ~., p. 141. 
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Positivism is a contradiction to the criteria set up for 
tr~th. 21 It is impossible to verify the statement in the 
laboratory that all statements must be verifiable in a lab-
oratory experiment which terminates in an operation. Hence, 
that statement that all statements which terminate in an 
operation are cognitive, is no more than emotive language 
and could only be used religiously, ethically, or perhaps 
prayerfully. And besides, since the idea of truth is not 
cognitive, hovT can anyone be certain whether the reports 
which other scientists bring out of the laboratory are true 
or false? Or even worse, if one were reasonably assured 
that the previous scientist has reported accurately, by 1tlhat 
method could he be certain that it would be true tomorrow 
since science knows only what it observes? If it would take 
for granted that the basic sentence that all statements to 
be factual must terminate in an operation were true today , 
hO\v could one ever be certain of tomorrovl? One can never 
put tomorrow in a laboratory. 
Carnell has pushed Positivism into an even worse pre-
dicament than this. Since it has recognized no ultimate 
values, one can well ask Positivism what the purpose of the 
accumulation of so great data is. One searches in vain in 
the laboratory for some presupposition which might infer the 
moral limitations of laboratory findings' uses. Without 
21. Ibid., p. 148. 
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moral values, without Christianity, Positivism possesses 
-
within itself the power for its mm destruction. Though 
this destruction may terminate in someone's laboratory, un-
fortunately the destruction may be so devastating that 
there might be a shortage of laboratory technicians for 
proper recording of statistics so that in the final analy-
sis this destruction itself would have very little to do 
with reality, but would be only of emotive value. 
There is little doubt but what scientific 
empiricists are (in general) most amiable and 
pleasant individuals, ones who would be first 
in their 0\vn actions to disclaim violence and 
destruction. But that is not the point. The 
point is that in his teaching, the positivist 
is undermining the very moral and spiritual 
vitalities upon which our culture was founded 
and which alone can dignify man. His personal 
piety may stem from his Christian heritage, but 
where shall the piety of his pagan students 
come from? Certainly it cannot come from pos-
itivi sm. It ··~must come from a structure of val-
ues which disavows the pretension that all cog-
nitive sentences are resolved by operations. 
Respect for human dignity, respect for justice, 
the preference of truth to error, goodness to 
wickedness, beauty to ugliness are normative 
values 'vhich have a priori justification. \'iho 
will be around to check the results if the fol-
lovJing sentence is carried out into an experi-
ment: "Destroying civilization through hydro-
gen bombs is a bad thing." In this instance 
truth crushed to earth will not rise again, 
for no scie~~ists will remain to construct new 
operations. 
From the foregoing facts, Carnell is persuaded that as sure-
ly as Christianity needs science, so science has ample need 
for Christianity. Christianity needs science to search 
22. Ibid., p. 168. 
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general revelation and amass the facts of nature. This very 
important task must not be depreciated as it was in the a 
priori Thomistic empiricism. But science needs the resources 
of Christianity to lay the metaphysical groundwork for labor-
atory science. Through Christianity alone, can these factors 
be amalgamated into a systematic coherent viewpoint of reali-
ty and thus be assured of their usefulness to society. 
This is what we mean by rapprochement be-
tween Christianity and the scientific method. 
Without the help of the scientific method, 
Christianity cannot make accurate contact with 
the details of God's providential working in 
nature; and without Christianity, science has 
no metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical 
frames of reference within which to give,world-
view meaning to the facts it colligates.-j 
F. THE NATURE OF TRUTH 
In previous discussion, it has been noted that truth 
can be said to reside in three loci. For epistemological 
purposes, only the first two are of importance. These two 
loci are the truth which resides in nature, and the truth 
which might be predicated concerning them. Positivism and 
Thomistic empiricism have demonstrated their inability lo-
gically, that is without contradiction, to united predica-
tion with the truth which actually resides in reality. 
The truth which men have is, of course, the truth which 
rests in propositions or statements about reality. Man 
23. Carnell, Apologetics, p. 232. 
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cannot have the truth in reality itself, for it ever remains 
in actuality. Only in propositions about reality which he 
believes to be true, can man hope to have the truth about 
reality~ One can make an assertion or proposition about 
sugar-coated sweet peas but he can never actually take them 
into his mind. So man must carefully check whatever state-
ments he might make against the actual reality of sugar-
toasted sweet peas as he has observed them empirically. How-
ever, because of man's inability, and because of the nature 
of that which man wishes to verify, he cannot have absolute 
certainty that his propositions about reality are true. At 
best, he can have only probability. Even in a laboratory, 
as men carefully measure again and again, they will never ob-
tain exactly the same answer twice. The answers must be writ-
ten in graphic form so that the mean may be obtained which 
is considered very near to t he correct answer. Yet it is 
only probably the right answer. In real life situations, 
so many causal factors enter into a situation, that one :can 
never be absolutely certain that he has eliminated them all 
as possible participants in the produced effect. Because 
Christianity is historical, it is impossible to demonstrate 
that which it holds true, for history never can be repeated. 
All one can do is gather historical witnesses to the facts, 
then he has probable knowledge. But this probable knowledge 
is just as much at home in the laboratory as it is in the 
field of ethics or Christian dogmatics. 
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First, let us establish securely the 
fact that proof for the Christian faith, as 
proof for any world-view that is worth talk-
ing about, cannot rise above rational proba-
bility. Probability is that state of coher-
ence in which more evidences can be corralled 
for a given hypothesis than can be amassed 
against it. The more the evidences increase, 
the more the strength of probability increases.24 
Even the Positivists must agree to this statement, for their 
world vie\v cannot be proven beyond doubt. Of course, to 
agree with this statement would also make the Positivist 
contradict himself. But Christ cannot be declaimed simply 
because He cannot be observed today. If we were to dis-
count Christianity's claim on such a basis, history would 
be impossible. To discover historical truths, historical 
evidences must be carefully weighed before decision can be 
made. In the case of world views, since to be a world view 
at all they must account for history, this is the only method 
possible. 
For some reason, not all theologians have 
seen that rational probability and perfect 
moral, or subjective, assurance are quite com-
patible. The Ritschlians went headfirst into 
f ·eeling theology, believing that "the charac-
teristic certitude of the religious believer 
tends to be impaired, at least temporarily, 
when the doctrines of the faith upon which he 
has been building his life and his hopes for 
the future are treated as mere metaphysical 
theories, to be tested by their rationality 
and their agreement with empirical fact." 
This divorce of faith and rationality has given 
the coup de grace to modernism, for faith with-
out objectively verifiable truth is comparable 
to the sort of certainty which goes along with 
24. Ibid., p. 113• 
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snake-handlers, sunadorers, and esoteric faith-
healing cults of sundry species. That private 
insight which exclaims, "I have it but I can-
not express it," is not the type of coherence 
which is necessary for science. Faith must be 
founded in objectively verifiable metaphysical 
theories even if they fail to provide perfect 
demons~ra~ion. Apart from this, theology has 
no log1c. ? 
G. THE STRUCTURE OF THE HIND 
During the ensuing discussion, an attempt will be made 
to examine the starting point of the epistemological theory 
which Carnell purports to be correct. This paper has dealt 
already with two view which have for their synoptic point 
effable external experience. 26 In both cases, the attempt 
was made to show that neither their conclusions were warranted 
by their starting point, nor their basis was adequate upon 
which to build any structure which purported to be a world 
view. According to the probability theory of knowledge, 
Carnell discarded these two theories in favor of internal 
effable experience. 27 The only other option for a synoptic 
point, internal ineffable experience, 28 is not worthy of 
discussion since it is nothing but mysticism and has no re-
lation to reality. It cannot, therefore, be proven or 
25. Ib:ii!,. , p. 116. 
26. Ibid., p. 126. 
27. Ibid., p. 125. 
28. Ibid. 
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disproven, but it has, as a result, no real relationship to 
actuality. 
Since sensory experience is limited to the flux, and 
from flux only flux can come, Carnell has posited in· the 
mind that which makes sensory experience meaningful. 
2. Internal effable experience. Not all 
experience in the soul is incapable of being 
expressed in words. As the histor y of ration-
alism proves, myriad are those keen minds which 
have been convinced that through a search of 
the soul's resident abilities universal and 
necessary principles, which are independent 
of sense perception, can be located and plotted. 
This is the course which the Christian will 
follow, so let us bypass it for the time be-
ing to return to it later. The security of 
this position is not to be confused with mys-
ticism 1 s ·'ineffable subjectivism, however, for 
by the method of effable internal experience, 
"a truth is seen in its relations to other 
knowledge, and so with something of the cer-
tainty that goes with demonstration," but it 
is "no unique and mystical warrant that guar-
antees it, but mere coher ence.n2;J 
Christian Rationalism, as Carnell has termed this po-
sition, has held that normative truths, such as the Good, 
the True and the Beautiful, depend upon innate knovrledge. 
After looking upon the flux of nature, how does man decide 
what is beautiful? Certainly, his sensation does not give 
a criteria alone for this. It is only innate knowledge 
which can assure one of the finality of truth and of good-
ness. This innate knowledge has been termed the "rationes 11 
which Carnell believes can be identified with the scriptural 
doctrines of the image of God which is in man. 
29. Ibid., p. 125. 
This structure blends nicely into the 
Christian doctrine of creation, for man is 
made in the image and after the likeness of 
God. Christ is the true Light which enlight-
ens every man. The Christian shares the con-
viction of Descartes, therefore, that "one 
certainly ought not to find it strange that 
God, in creating me, placed this idea (God) 
within me to be like the rna~~ of the work-
man imprinted on his work; and it is like-
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wise not essential that the mark shall be 
something different from the work itself." ••• 3° 
Having relied wholly upon sensation for knowledge, the 
empiricist has always involved himself with the difficulty 
of the finality of truth. If all truth and knowledge are 
subject to fluctuation, why then is not their basic premise 
also subject to the same conditions? But by its very nature, 
it has already been demonstrated that this type of premise 
cannot be sustained by the very criteria which is purports 
to lay down. Hence, all empiricists are involved in an 
initial contradiction which cannot be resolved. It is im-
possible to start with any other synoptic point other than 
that of internal effable experience. 
Empiricists of all sorts are faced with another diffi-
cult explanation. Who is the one who observes, and upon vrhom 
do sensations have effect? Is there such a thing as mind, 
and if there is, how can I know it simply through empirical 
observation alone? The depths of mind can never be known 
by empirical methods because instead of being the object of 
sensations, the mind is always the recipient of all sensation. 
30. Ibid., p. 160. 
••• It lies in the very nature of the case 
that the self can never become the object of 
experience, because the self, whatever else 
it might be, is in the indefeasible situa-
tion of being the subject of experience. A 
knowledge of the self seems, then, in the 
very nature of the case fore-doomed. How-
ever, the tti think" is quite inescapable and 
it is not sufficiently ac1ounted for inHume's 
laws of association ••• j 
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Knowledge of self, the existence of the mind, can never be 
explained satisfactorily by empiricists. The rules of logic 
are an enigma. Certainly these a priori laws have never been 
fully accounted for by the sensationalists • 
• • • In order to think clearly, men are obliged 
to accept the validity of certain laws of thought. 
These would include: the Principle of Identity, 
that we must stick to our meaning or definitions 
throughout an argument; the Principle of Contra-
diction, that two contradictory propositions 
cannot both be true; and the Principle of Suf-
ficient Reas?n, that3 ~here must be a cause of every happen~ng ••• 
From these laws of logic which give to all of life's 
sensation their meaning, man became aware of the existence 
of God. God cannot be deduced from the flux alone, but He 
can be deduced from the changeless, eternal rules of logic . 
From the awareness of the soul of its own 
endowments it knows God, for only a trans-tem-
poral, trans-spatial Mind can sustain the time-
less character of logic. We have not elected 
to be logical; another has made us that way. 
The smoothest hypothesis to account for this 
31. George Thomas White Patrick, Introduction to 
Philosophy (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), 
p. 246. 
32. Harold H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosopqy 
(New York, American Book Company, 19l+b'), p. 179. 
making is, not the brute bumping of undi-
rected atoms, but the creation of man in 
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the image of God. This is the structure the 
Christian chooses to follow, for he believes 
the postulate of a rational God to be a work-
able 1·:\p~pothesis in the light of the evidence.33 
Knowledge of self in quite a different way makes us avrare 
of God. Not only is man made aware that there must be a 
God because he does not resemble nature, but also because 
he does resemble the flux, hence unlike God • 
• • • Without the aid of sensation, man knows 
that he is finite, dependent, and wretched; 
. but these adjectives would be absolutely 
meaningless \d thout a prior knm..rledge of their 
correlatives, infinity, independence, and fel-
icity. These belong to God alone. 11To knovr 
self implies, therefore, the co~knowledge with 
self of that on which it derives, by the stan-
dard of which its imperfection is revealed, to 
\vhich it is responsible." We knmo~ God as that 
Being over against Whom \ve are perpetually set, 
upon Whom we completely depend, and to Whom we 
are finally responsible. All of this we knovr 
from a knowledge of our own finite, sinful, in-
felicitous condition ••• 3~ 
But the rationes not only bids us be a'vare of God be-
cause of ourselves, but because of General Revelation. With-
out the presupposi.tion, or the existence of the a priori, 
a demonstration such as Thomas attempted would be impossible. 
• • • If we knmo1 not the truth before coming to 
sensation the world is neither rational nor 
irrational, for the terms are meaningless. If 
we know not the standard for good, the world 
is neitmr good nor bad. So \vith beauty, it 
is neither lovely nor ugly. But these criteria 
33. Carnell, Introduction to Apologetics, p. 164. 
34. Ibid., p. 159. 
depe~~ for their existence upon the mind of 
God. 
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Though man catches the meaning of nature and of general rev-
elation, he is hindered from actirgupon his knowledge in a 
rational manner because of his 0\1n defection. Seeing the 
beauty of the lilies, man should cast himself prostrate at 
the feet of God, but sin has always prevented him from pure 
rational insight. 
Because he speaks of both "natural" rev-
elation7 i.e., the revelation of the meaning 
of reality in the facts of time and space, 
and "special 11 revelation, i.e., the proposi-
tional content of the Bible, the Christian 
can meaningfully speak of the "incompetence" 
of the human reason. The reason of man, in . 
addition to being partially corrupted because 
of sin, is incompetent to work out a complete 
view of God and man because it, in ~ts unaided 
state, is not supplied with enough informa-
tion to complete its philosophy. The data 
which special revelation supplies is needed 
to supplement the data which natural revela-
tion displays. • .Just as the intellect of 
man is incompetent to demonstrate that there 
is another side of the moon, because of the 
inaccessibility of the data, so also it is 
incompetent to complete a philosophy of life 
without special revelation from God. Be-
cause of our sinful hearts, which vitiate 
the evidence of nature, a more sure voice is 
needed to lead us into a theory of reality 
which is horizontally self-consistent and 
which vertically fits the facts.36 
Because of the rationes, man has been able to do many 
good things, propound many good philosophies, and make re-
ligions which contain many truths. But because of sin, none 
35. ~., p. 169. 
36. Ibid., p. 156. 
96 
of them contain the whole truth. None of them contain truth 
only, for all of them are truth mixed with error. Only by 
special revelation, could all men's quest for happiness be 
satisfied. It answers the question of death itself and 
assures all men of the hope of life eternal. This special 
revelation is none other than the Bible. Its appeal is 
worded strongly, and directed toward the rationes so as to 
be irresistably logical. No other form of philosophy or 
religion can possibly make this claim • 
• • • From Genesis through Revelation, these 
men wrote sober truth. One self-consistent, 
historically accurate, plan of salvation runs 
through their hundreds of pages of manuscripts 
which, astoundingly, were written by men rela-
tively ignorant of the existence of each other. 
Hoses gave the plan of salvation in Genesis 
3:15, thousands of years before its fulill-
ment: "I will put enmity between thee and the 
woman, and between thy seed and her seed: he 
shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise 
his heel." The prophets passionately unfolded 
it; the gospels carefully outlined it; and the 
epistles immacul ately completed it. Toward 
the end of s pecial revelation, Paul said, "The 
God of peace will soon crush Satan under your 
feet" (Romans 16:20), pointing to the last 
jot-and-tittle fulfillment of Genesis 3:15. 
In t his entire system of salvation there is 
nothing repulsive to the reason of .'man; there 
is nothing impossible, immoral, absurd noth-
ing inconsist~ut vlith the corpus of vreil-at-
tested truth • .:S"I 
H. THE BIBLE 
Equating the Bible with Special Revelation, Carnell 
37. Ibid., p. 179. 
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must face the difficulties of" higher and lower criticism 
with which neither Barth nor Brunner were forced to contend. 
Higher and lower criticism has proported to find many errors 
in the Bible, so many in fact, that the Bible could not pos-
sibly be accepted by a rational man. These errors are both 
historical inaccuracies and errors in logic. Carn~ll has 
admitted that the Bible does contain many problems. To not 
admit them is simply to deny the facts • 
• • • These efforts have left the conservatives 
in a predicament. On the one hand, he admits 
that the Bible is the infallibly inspired word 
of God, and yet, on the other, confesses that 
there are not a few difficulties in the pre-
sent text. "The conscientious student has, 
therefore, great difficulty sometimes in re-
solving problems raised by apparent contra-
dictions ••• and he may frankly confess that 
he is not able to explain an apparent discrep-
ancy in the teaching of Scripture." To the 
modern mind the conservative position seems 
like weaseffi-wording.3~ 
Carnell has avoided much of the difficulty by limiting 
infallibility to only the original autographs. As the Bible 
is a very ancient book, this would mean that it was subject 
to a great many errors in the process of copying which took 
place. As the living Word of God was broken at the hands 
of sinful men, so also has been the fate of the "rri tten word 
of God. As general revelation was marred by sin, so also 
was special revelation. But as in general revelation, there 
has remained sufficient truth in special revelation to bring 
all men to repentance. The major radicals upon which the 
38. Ibid., p. 191. 
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Christian religion is built, are not 2 subject to the dis-
pute. 
Christianity knows no contradiction of 
its radicals. All the work of the higher 
critic has fallen short of refuting the sys-
tem from this perspective. As for the minor 
difficulties, we appeal to the complicated 
character of realityt the parallels to sci-
?nce, and the §~ct or our o-vm finitude and 
~gnorance. • • 
Carnell's basic assumption is then, that the original 
documents, not copies nor translations, were inspired . This 
is a rather difficult theory either to prove or to disprove 
with finality since none of the autographs are available for 
scrutiny. The reasons for believing must be purely rational 
ones since no empirical evidence exists. On this assumption 
Carnell's basic argument is that if God did not deliver to 
man infallible words then either He would not and was in-
tentionally deceiving man, or that He could not, hence was 
only a fini te God. For if God could not, then there must 
be some force greater than He which was preventing Him from 
doing as He wished. The reason for errors in the copies, 
was the sinfulness of the copyers • 
• • • Thirdly, permitting ·man to fall into tran~ 
scriptional error in so holy and religious an 
assignment as copying the originally inspired 
manuscripts, is the highest possible testimony 
to that complete penetration into our inward 
lives that sin enjoys, and shows that, no mat-
ter how hard a zealot may concentrate, pray, · 
and petition for grace, he still falls shor~ 
39. ~., p. 209. 
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of the immaculate Son of God. 4-o 
• • 
At first glance, one might be satisfied with this explana-
tion ·of the problem, but this investigator seriously ques-
tions the value of such an explanation. Looking at the 
issue from one point of view, the sceptic would ask if God 
were not limited in that He could not preserve the copies 
made from error1 If God could give us infallible auto-
graphs through sinful men, why not faithful copies through 
sinful men? From the other point of view, if the copyists 
were sinful men and erred because they could not reach the 
perfection of the Son of God, why did not the original 
writers also err for were they not also sinners such as we 
and not gods? Certainly, the scriptures cannot be denied 
to reflect the fact that human personality influenced not 
only what was said, but the manner in which it is ··expressed. 
The answer which Carnell has given to this question is that 
God elected not to have the copyists inspired, just as He 
elected to let His perfect universe fall into partial cor-
ruption.41 This would lead us into further difficulties 
which will be discussed in the problem of evil. 
Having retreated, Carnell has still another dilemma 
which he has not solved. If only the radicals are not touched 
by modern higher criticism, who is to define the radicals? 
4-o. Ibid., p. 199. 
41. Ibid., p. 198. 
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If only the radicals remain why then not only the radicals 
inspired if that is all that is necessary? Hume•s rule of 
efficient cause would certainly imply that this would be 
true. Since error has entered into Revelation, and all 
error is evil, then the whole issue is bound to the question 
of moral evil. Let us turn to this chapter in Carnell and 
attempt to determine hmv he \vould solve the problem. The 
basic proposition of Christianity, the God who has revealed 
Himself in Holy Scriptures, is at stake on t his issue. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
Carnell has made the fact of the Personality of God 
basic to the understanding of the problem of evil. As a 
Person, God is not an impersonal rule of changeless logic, 
but makes free decisions. 42 One of these free decisions, 
was the creation of the world. God is never under necessity 
for necessity would mean that He lacked something in Him-
self.43 The creation of God was a perfect creation, re-
flecting the majesty and the glory of God. But into crea-
tion, man and angels have brought the fact of sin. 
::. · · Into this perfect universe, man and angel 
brought sin and disruption through their de-
fection from the Divine commands. The creature, 
therefore, not God, is responsible for all of 
the sin and sorrow which make up both natural 
42. Ibid., p. 293. 
43. l12iQ.. 
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and moral evil ••• 44 
But Christianity avows that before Creation, God had a plan 
for the redemption of the world. This was not an emergency 
plan in the case sin did occur, for this would limit the 
fore-knowledge of God, making Him finite. Sin was not only 
knmvn by God, but it came about only because it was divinely 
_ decreed. 
• •• This means that God infallibly knew that, 
if He created man upon earth, man would fall 
into sin and require the restoring merits of 
the God-Man, Jesus Christ; and yet He vrent 
right ahead and created man in the garden of 
Eden. The crucifixion, ~ worst examp~~ of 
evil, was not only permitted by God; it ~ 
sovereignl~ decreed ••• In history, then, 
there is no surd, inexplicable, or antinomy. 
History is as rational at every point as the 
rational God Who decrees its movement. There 
is no strength but what comes from the strength 
of Israel; there i~5no being but what stems from the Almighty. 
If God has decreed evil, why should men then resist it? 
Carnell answers, simply because God has so commanded men to 
act.46 Then the Almighty, All-Pow~rful, All-Sustaining God 
has not only always enabled the powers of Good but the powers 
of evil. Why then cannot man call God before the courtroom 
and in solemn assembly commit Him to be banished forever _ 
from the universe? . Did He not decree the greatest of all 
44. 
45. 
46. 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
p. 294. 
p. 295. 
p. 299. 
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evils? But Carnell answers, to v1hom would God be responsi-
ble? As Sovereign God , He cannot be held accountable to 
anyone for His actions. Because He is not responsible to 
anyone or anything, how can God be responsible for sin? It 
is God who is right and not man. God does not have to do 
good exactly as society conceives the good. If He were 
limited in any such way, then He would be a finite god, His 
actions having been controlled by the reason of man. Though 
man through reason cannot account for anything good except 
that \'lhich is bound to the ten commandments, yet God 1 s actions 
are not so bound. The rightness or wrongness of an action 
then is plainly whether or not God has placed His approval 
upon that act. 
In short, the decalogue is of force only 
where sinners are concerned; but God is the 
Holy One. Of what, then, does Mill speak "ilhen 
He says that God must possess the same moral 
attributes which one finds in a good man here 
in society? God cannot be compared to ma~~ it 
is man that is to be compared to God ••• t 
Does the v10rld seem to fall short of man's expecta-
tions? Does one wish that sin did not exist? Then he en-
visions a world which God does not and never did see. .For 
this world is the best possible of all worlds • 
• • • The universe, with all of the evil in 
it, is the best possible of all worlds, for 
the very reason that God, the standard of 
good, has called it good. But it is part 
of the goodness of this universe that the 
47. Ibid., p. 310. 
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sin which God permitte~ to enter that He 
might display His grace and love to the sons of 
men, is to be extirpata~ by the death of His 
Son, Jesus Christ ••• 
Is it possible that God did intend for sin to emerge 
into the universe? Carnell affirms that He did. Since it 
is logical that God is an Absolutely free individual, Carnell 
argued that He can do as He chooses. Since He is all Power-
ful and could have prevented sin, He chose that sin should 
exist in the universe since that is the only possible 1.vay 
that it could exist. 
Should one persist in his affirmation 
that God did not intend to create a world 
in which sin would emerge, 1.ve can only ask 
where this one has received his information 
on the subject. Unless he appeals to a pri-
vate revelation which cannot be checked by 
the law of contradiction, we know of no 
source. It does not come from an analysis 
of history, for history bears out that Christ 
did die on the cross. If God did not want 
Him to do so, then we are back on the finite 
God position and we have no hope. And the 
Bible certainly does not teach God was dis-
pleased with the death of Christ. On the 
contrary, "it aleased Jehovah to bruise him. 
he shall see of the travail of his soul, and 
shall be satisfied" (Isaiah 53:10-11). Logic 
cannot be appealed to, for vle have else1.vhere 
shown that it is logical to suppose that God 
is free to do what He wants without being 
called into account. Vfuat new source, then, 
does our objector appeal to? Until it is 
forthcoming, we cannot continue the argument 
at this point.4-9 
• • 
At two very difficult points, Carnell leaves his reader with 
unanswered questions. What does Carnell mean by the holiness 
l+~.L~ · Ibid. ; . pr;.o~oo. 
49. Ibid., p. 304. 
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of God? Certainly this answer cannot be rational i n the 
light of what has preceeded. In addition, how does Carnell 
define the freedom of man, which he had already averred,50 
and still be consistent with his theory of divine decrees 
which govern history? If one were to ask Carnell the ques-
tion, who is responsible for sin, man or God, Carnell cer-
tainly has thrown his effort on the side which attempts t o 
blame God. 
Carnell's position, which might be described as 
Christian Rationalism, might be summarized as an attempt to 
place and to find the proper emphasis and balance upon both 
the a pr iori and the a posteriori. The a priori,which enables 
man to make predications concerning that vlhich he is a\vare 
of empi rically, is made identical with the Biblical image 
of God in man. Wherever the se predications conform to re-
ality, it may be said that man has the truth. Because of 
man's limitations, he is unable through this method to com-
plete a philosophy which adequately includes all of reality. 
Hence, God has Divinely revealed that which man must know 
to complete his philosophy, which revelation also appeals 
to the human reason. Thus it may be said that the basis of 
faith, \vhich Carnell defines as trust or comiili tment, is the 
reason. Without r ea son there can be no faith. However, it 
may be seriously questioned whether Carnell can defend his 
view through reason. 
50. Carnell, Philosophy of the Christian Religion, p. 16. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE STUDY 
A purported new theology ha s sprung into existence dur-
ing the past few decades. Like Conservative theology·, it 
has claimed direct descendence from the reformers. In like 
manner, it has made its appeal to the Word of God for direc-
tion and guidance. But is this new theology really a return 
to reformation teachings? Certainly, without fear of denial, 
it can be said that it has been a return to reformation ter-
mino~ogy. Unfortunately, the appearance of theological ter-
minology alone does not guarantee the validity of the claim 
of this new theology. Terminology must be examined in the 
light of its context, and in this way the concept which lies 
behind the use of the terms might be learned. Again, one 
would be forced to concede that the new theology has evi-
denced a desire to return to the methods of the reformers. 
In this respect, it has emphasized the importance and the 
sacredness of the pulpit and the calling of the ministry. A 
new and vital function has been given to the field of dog-
matic theology. But when one has examined these points of 
similarity, there is still the certain feeling that one has 
not really gotten to the issue. It has not yet been raised. 
The point of cont act upon which this study has chosen 
to force the issue, is the relationship of faith and reason 
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as found in the t'I:J'O leading continental proponents of the 
new theology. Of course, these concepts never appear in 
isolation and can only be judged by their appearance in the 
over-all system. Hence, it has been a conclusion of this 
paper, that a complete understanding of the intended rela-
tionship of reason:··and faith cannot be under stood without 
some basic understanding of and use of their basic termi-
nology. 
As a summary, some of the terminology which has appeared 
frequently in the reading will be examined, and its use, as 
well as it can be determined, succinctly given. In this 
way, the relatj.onship of fai t:P and reason as considered by 
each of these men will be brought to focus. 
1. Karl Barth 
a. Philosophy - A complete philosophy of the 
world is not possible. The antinomies of existence are be-
yond the scope of reason, their solution being known to God 
alone. The relationship of theology and philosophy is pure-
ly negative. 
b. God - God is the Wholly Other. In no sense 
can He be considered as a part of this world. He must di-
rectly reveal to each individual all that can be known about 
Him. As a Revealing God, He is bound by no restrictions 
whatsoever. 
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c. History - History has no rational relation-
ships. No theory of its development, and hence its culmina-
tion is possible. 
d. Revelation - Revelation is God speaking to 
man. It is always accompanied by an act of history or na-
ture in such a way that it can be mistaken by man as that 
act alone. Primarily, revelation occurs in three forms: The 
Bible, Proclamation, and the Sacraments. Revelation is gi-
ven to meet the needs of a specific individual at a specific 
occasion. 
e. Biblical Criticism - A critical study of the 
Bible is justified, since the Bible as a part of the world, 
is a finite book. This pertains to both higher and lower 
criticism. Its conclusions are not really a matter of con-
cern since God can use any portion of the Bible He wishes 
no matter what the critics might say concerning it. 
f. The World -The World is not God. Nothing in 
it, in anyway, resembles Him. From the world, nothing can 
be learned of God. The basic reason for this is that the 
world is limited, relative, and finite. 
g. Evil - Evil is an integral part of human ex-
istence. It is a condition from which man cannot hope to 
escape. Man is not God, therefore, he is evil. 
h. Image of God - Bet\veen Irian and God there is no 
similarity. There is no point of contact between the two, 
nothing inherent in man which makes him particularly recep-
tive to the \·lord of .God. 
108 
i. Theology - This is an attempt to ascertain 
the true message of God. There is no assurance that the 
church, by application of theology, will ever be able to 
arrive at final truth. The Church cannot even be sure that 
she is even approaching it. The basic presuppositions to 
theology are faith and revelation. 
j. Faith - Faith is the reception of the Word of 
God. It is the recognition that reason cannot of itself and 
by itself solve the radical problems of life. Though faith 
is the reception of the Word of God, it does not comprehend 
its nature. That is the divine mystery. 
k. Reason - Reason is the ability of man to or-
ganize the data which comes to it through the experiences of 
life. Though comprehension and understanding are possible, 
reason is frustrated whenever it attempts to resolve the 
great dialectical antinomies of the world into a coherent 
system. This is the miracle of God. 
2. Emil Brunner 
a. Philosophy - Philosophy is possible as far as 
it is related to the present world. In this realm, reason 
is supreme. 
b. God - God is Absolute Person. As Person, He 
can only be known as He reveals Himself in personal en-
counter. 
c. History - History is of importance only as it 
bears relationship to the person of Christ. It has two 
forms, preparation and fulfillment. 
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d. Revelation - Revelation is two fold. There 
is an original or general revelation by which man can know 
the law. This makes man responsible, hence a sinner. But 
general revelation is inadequate to create in man a new will, 
so that man has never fulfilled the requirements of the law. 
God can not be knO\m s~.YS1 as He reveals Himself in Personal 
Encounter. The supreme revelation of God is Jesus Christ. 
He is the Word of God. 
e. Biblical Criticism - Within limits, Biblical 
criticism ·· is beneficial. Criticism has served to breakdmm 
the Bibliolatry of conservative Christianity. However, 
Biblical criticism is limited to that which pertains to this 
world only. Concerning that which pertains to God, criticism 
has no validity. This step, when taken, is to be deplored 
since it is the rearing of the ugly head of autonomy. 
f. The ~vorld - Though man 1 s knowledge of the 
world is relative, this is basically caused by the sinful-
ness of his reason. The world bears upon it the imprint of 
its creator, which is the divine law for man. 
g. Evil - Evil is the positive rejection by man 
of the Lordship of God. It is man's attempt to make him-
self autonomous. Its manifestation is the attempt to sub-
jugate all things to the human reason. 
· h. Image of God - Used in the moral sense, the 
image of God has been destroyed in man. But in the purely 
formal sense, it has · not been destroyed. Reason, which is 
the basis of the image, is not lost. What has been lost is 
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the right use of reason. 
i. Theology - Dogma should not be allowed to be-
come fixed as it has become in conservative theology. With-
in certain limits it should be allowed to fluctuate. If it 
is allowed to crystallize, dogma rather than God becomes the 
object of faith. Dogma is only useful as a sign which points 
to the person of Christ and changes should be made whenever 
necessary to serve this function. 
j. Faith -Faith is personal encounter with Christ. 
It leaps over history to confrontChrist as Lord. It is faith 
which sets reason aright. It preserves the true· .character of 
reason. The sinfulness of the individual is completely re-
alized in this act, and he commits himself to complete trust 
in the "power of God. 
k. Reason Reason; by its very natur e 5 s limited 
to this world. Reason convinces men of guilt. It perceives 
the law of God in nature. Its very function reminds one of 
God. Though reason can bring man to the point of despair, 
it is only by faith and the act of personal encounter than 
man ever knows God. 
3. E.J. Carnell 
a. Philosophy - By its very nature, philosophy 
should and can account for all the facts. This refers both 
to the things of this world, and to God. 
b. God - God is Sovereign Person. As this, He 
is under no necessity whatsoever. As completely Free, He 
/ 
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can do whatever He pleases. He cannot be held accountable 
for His acts by man. 
c. History - History has no rational connections. 
Rather, it is a teleological development. History is car-
ried out minutely according to the decrees of God. It is 
rational development only by the fact that God can be re-
alized rationally, as a Sovereign Person and as such He can 
decree as He wishes. 
d. Revelation- Revelation is the originally in- . 
spired autographs of the Books of the Bible. There is also 
a secondary revelation in nature which makes all men re-
sponsible, but the supreme revelation of God occurred in 
the person of Jesus Christ. 
e. Biblical Criticism - There are problems in the 
Bible. However, these problems are on trifling points which 
are of little importance to the radical truths of revelation. 
Lower criticism is to be commended in its efforts to find the 
correct texts, since it has helped to solve many of the dif-
ficulties raised by higher criticism. The basic fault of 
higher criticism is that it approaches the Bible with an 
antagonistic philosophy, which inevitably decimates its real 
character. 
f. The World -This is the best possible of all 
worlds. This is the world -which God Himself ordained. The 
question of whether or not finiteness does of itself signify 
that it is sinful is left ambiguous due to conflict in the 
use of irreconcilable terminology. 
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g. Evil - Evil and sin have been decreed by God. 
As Absolute Sovereign, nothing could occur in history, un-
less God had decreed it. There is no surd or antinomy to 
God in history. He sustains and orders it all. 
h. The Image of God - The Image of God in man, 
as far as formal structure is concerned, is retained. It 
enables men to comprehend the good, the true, and the beauti-
ful as he sees it in sensory experience. 
i. Theology - A right theology cannot be avoided. 
Man's rational nature demands that he systematize. However, 
theology cannot be considered an end in itself, but simply 
as the means by which people are brought to a relationship 
with God. 
j. Faith - Faith is personal commitment. It is 
the act of becoming the truth. It is the highest act of 
reason. It is its logical resultant. Reason has commanded 
us to have faith. 
k. Reason - Reason is the ability of the mind to 
make predications concerning reality. Whether these cor~ 
respond to reality or not is the test of reason. Reason 
itself is not sufficient to give one a complete philosophy 
due to the fact that man has neither sufficient time nor ex-
perience to formulate completely unaided such a philosophy. 
Special revelation, appealing to the reason, completes man's 
philosophy. It is this philosophy which sustains faith, for 
man cannot commit himself to that which he does not know. 
113 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Barth averred that reason has no relationship to faith. 
The Word of God which speaks to man, carries a message, but 
hmv it is apprehended is left in doubt. The 1tlord of God 
comes home to the individual and is understood by the thought 
of faith. But yet this thought of faith does not conceive 
the Word of God as it really is. That this thought of faith 
is also a thought of reason can be presumed. But the message 
is a message which comes when his own reason has expended 
itself. It is the voice of God grasped by faith when man 
is in despair. 
Brunner asserted that there is a positive as well as 
a negative relationship between faith and reason. It is 
positive because man must be rationally .convinced of the 
necessity to learn by faith. He has not understood himself 
in the right light. He has not understood the world in its 
true meaning. He is -yrrong. In this hour of desperateness, 
the Word of God comes to him by faith. Though this message 
must pass through the rational comprehension, yet the act 
of faith, the complete trust in God, must follow or the reve-
lation is in vain. Then, and then only, is man able to see 
the world around him as it really is. He truly then knows 
the Lordship of God. 
Carnell stated that reason is the basis of faith. As 
one commits himself he does so as a rational act. He commits 
himself because he knows God rationally. It is not a leap 
lllr 
into the unknown to have faith in God. One must know a 
great deal about God before he places himself into a posi-
tion of complete trust. 
All three men agree that faith is different than rea-
son. It implies the act of personal commitment and trust. 
In this assertion, one cannot help but feel a healthy em-
phasis away from the cold, non-commital attitude of modern 
liberalism. At least proffered help is recognized. It is 
no longer man's complete reliance upon hi~self. 
The question which must plague Carnell, and everyone 
who has read him, is whether the God whom he described is 
really worthy of commitment and trust. After he has esta-
blished that God is a Sovereign Person and does what He wills 
one feels that Carnell has moved toward the very brink of 
the irrational. But \vhen he informed us that God decrees 
both the good and the evil, that He is not answerable to any 
laws, seemingly not even His mm nature, the definite im-
pression is that the brink has been passed. Rationally, one 
is convinced that he really does not know much about such 
a God • 
. An interesting point of comparison between Carnell and 
Brunner is that the former asserted that reason supports 
faith while the latter asserted that faith supports reason. 
Basic to these two concepts is the fundamental idea which 
reason conveys. Brunner has the Kantian concept of reason, 
Carnell does not. They differed on one very important point. 
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Carnell asser ted that the reality which reason perceives is 
very real. Reason is merely the perception of truth in re-
ality. Hence the Good, the True, the Beautiful, Time,, and 
Space are really existent. They are not merely categories 
of the mind which are appended on to that which is real. 
Thus reason does not change nor limit reality, but enables 
man to see things as they are in the objective world. Hence, 
. one can see hmv both Barth and Brunner 1vould hesitate to al-
low man to comprehend anything of God with his Reason. For 
reason is a limiting concept to them. 
As a point of positive compar±son, one can compare the 
attitude of Carnell toward Science and Brunner toward rea-
son. Faith, according to Carnell can set Science right. It 
points out the path which makes Science constructive rather 
than destructive. Science alone cannot b1ow this. The same 
could be said concerning Brunner's concept of what faith 
does for reason. 
Some Conservatives have objected to the Nee-Orthodox 
view of revelation because of its subjectivity. Both c. F. 
H. Henryl and Nobel V. Sack2 are in this category. They 
would seriously question the superiority of revelation as 
1. c. F. H. Henry The Protestant Dilemma (Grand 
Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1949), 
p. 107. . 
2. Nobel V. Sacl{, "Brunner 1 s Concept of Revelation 
and Reason," (unpublished term paper presented to North-
ern Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois, n.d.), 
p. 41. 
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it is given to man in Neo-Orthodoxy and as revelation has 
appeared in Modernism. How can one know whether the divine 
message is revealed or whether man is elevated? Whether God 
has become man, or man become Gods? Witnout some sort of 
objective criteria one cannot know this. Fundamentalists 
claim to have this criteria within the Bible which is Reve-
lation. This whole question is of quite some embarrassment 
to the Neo-Orthodox. With their transcendent doctrine of 
God as the Wl1olly Other, how can He become Immanent? On the 
other hand, if God does not become Immanent, why have God at 
all, for man would never be able to know Him. They attempt, 
therefore, to avoid the difficulty of Modernism, by segregat-
ing faith from reason. Thus God is not comprehended by an 
elevation of reason as in Modernism, but an elevation of 
faith. In this way, God is brought under no limitations, but 
is still sovereign person. And after all, they might point 
out , all certainty is ultimately subjective. If certainty 
is not subjective, then it is not certainty at all. 
But the detachment made between faith and reason will 
inevitably lead into far worse difficulties. Neo-Orthodoxy, 
by severing God from all rational connection with the world, 
has unloaded the possibility of disavowing God Himself. Why 
God at all who speaks? ~fuy not some subjective non-rational 
impulse? Jean-Paul Sartre, a French Existentialist, has made 
this point forcibly. His existential philosophy is very 
similar in content to that of either Barth or Brunner. Man 
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is placed in the world, in the midst of difficulties and 
problems which have no rational solution. In this perplex-
ity, man is forced to choose, and in choosing, he is choosing 
what he wishes all men to be. But does not God present to 
us a message which might help man to know and to choose that 
which is right? Of this Sartre says it would make little 
difference. 
Anguish is evident even when it conceals 
itself. This is the anguish that Kierkegaard 
called the anguish of Abraham. You know the 
story: an angel has ordered Abraham to sacri-
fice his son; if it really were an angel who 
has come and said, "You are Abraham, you will 
sacrifice your son," everything vlould be all 
right. But everyone might first \'/onder, 11 Is 
it really an angel, and am I really Abraham? 
What proof do I have?" There was a madwoman 
who had hallucinations; someone used to speak 
to her on the telephone and give her orders. 
Her doctor asked her, "Who is it who talks to 
you? 11 She answered, 11He says it ' s God. 11 What 
proof did she really have that it was God? 
If an angel comes to me, what proof is there 
that it's an angel? And if I hear voices, 
what proof is there that they come from heaven 
and not from hell, or from the subconscious, 
or a pathalogical condition? What proves that 
they are addressed to me? What proof is there 
that I have been appointed to impose my choice 
and my conception of man on humanity? I'll 
never find any proof or sign to convince me 
of that. If a voice addresses me, it is al-
\vaysfor me to decide that this is the angel's 
voice; if I consider that such an act is a 
good one, it is I who ,.,ill choose to say that 
it is good rather than bad.3 
This is further clarified in another portion of his work. 
3. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism, trans. by Bernard 
Frechtman (New York, Philosophical Library, 1947), 
pp. 22-2lr. 
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From these few reflections it is evident 
that nothing is more unjust than the object-
ions that have been raised against us. Exis~ ·­
tentialism is nothing else than an attempt to 
draw all .the consequences of a coherent athe-
istic position. It isn't trying to plunge man 
into despair at all. But if one calls every 
attitude of Q~belief despair, like the Christ-
ians1 then the word is not being used in its 
orig1nal sense. Existentialism isn't so athe-
istic that is wears itself -out showing that 
God doesn't exist. Rather, it declares that 
even if God did exist, that would change no-
thing. There you've got our point of view. 
Not that we believe that God exists, but we 
think that the problem of His existence is 
not the issue. In this sense existentialism 
is optimistic, a doctrine of action, and it 
is plain dishonesty for Christians to make 
not distinction between their own de~pair and 
ours and then to call us despairing. 
Here is a peculiar paradox. Both Barth and Brunner a-
verred that reason can only lead to antinomies and atheism. 
Here is the example of where complete, irrational, subject-
ivism also leads. But Barth would maintain that these ir-
rational subjective suggestions must be a paraphrase of the 
Bible. But was not Barth's original choice of the Bible al-
so subjective? Where did he get that? And why does Brunner 
choose Christ? If both men were not rationally led to ac-
cept this, as they both deny, then this must have been a 
subjective choice. Then why are not all choices subjective 
and leave God out of it all together? In t his queer irration-
al world in which both the existentialist and Neo~Orthodox 
d\.rell, God cannot be proved rationally nor any other vray to 
·4. Ibid., p. 61. 
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be a very necessary part of their construction. 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS 
So many areas have :'lopened for further study it would 
not be possible to list them all. At best, it will only be 
possible to classify some of the areas which could be fur-
ther investigated. Of course, one of the primary areas ~or 
investigation would be a comparison in the different areas 
of theology between the Conservative position of Calvinism 
and the Neo-Orthodox theology. 
Another area which should be investigated, would be 
the adequacy of Arminian Christian philosophy. Some of the 
authors who have written in this field should be examined 
as to the vital issues of the Divine Holiness and Soverein-
ty. It has already been demonstrated how inadequate the 
Conservative Calvinistic position is in these fields. 
Another field of research suggested in this study, is 
that of a serious consideration of the chief discrepancies 
claimed in thetexts of the Bible by critics. It should be 
so forcibly presented that it would .determine for our time 
whether or not it is possible either to resolve these dis-
crepencies, or to leave them open for the consideration of 
future generations. 
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